I just came across a short piece by Julia Annas, Happiness As Achievement, that does a nice job of introducing the Aristotelean conception of happiness.
I just came across a short piece by Julia Annas, Happiness As Achievement, that does a nice job of introducing the Aristotelean conception of happiness.
Go Julia! Also check out her recent piece on the phenomenology of virtue. Then, I’d be really interested to see your take on it.
Here: http://www.springerlink.com/content/q47r0p2n14438121/
What an awesome paper. Doesn’t this sort of argument strengthen the case for updating Rothbard’s praxeology? I mean, where does he leave room for understanding eudaimonia? If happiness is objective and entails achievement, what category of action points to this mode of behavior?
Voluntary interpersonal exchange on the unhampered market would allow understanding eudaimonia. But it doesn’t rule out ignoring eudaimonia. If all states fell today, most people would still, more than likely, operate through subjective notions of happiness–even states of happiness that other people could bring about for them.
So isn’t understanding eudaimonia logically prior to successful long-term exchange on the unhampered market? And if that’s the case, shouldn’t we add another category of human action to praxeology?
I would love to get a pdf copy of “The Phenomenology of Virtue” and some of Annas’s other works, but unfortunately I don’t have easy access to a university library at the moment. Roderick, could you scan it (some) for me?