I don’t think anyone’s music has been more important to me over the past two decades than Cohen’s.
I don’t think anyone’s music has been more important to me over the past two decades than Cohen’s.
[cross-posted at BHL]
Conventional wisdom has it that a) you have a duty to vote, and more specifically that b) at least in winner-take-all two-party electoral systems like the u.s., you have a duty to vote for whichever you regard as the least bad of the two major candidates (as opposed to “throwing away your vote” on a third-party candidate).
According to a contrary argument, one that enjoys some popularity in libertarian circles, c) voting – for anyone – is irrational, since the outcome is overwhelmingly likely to be the same whether you vote or not.
I think all three of these positions are mistaken.
Think first about (c), the argument that voting is irrational. If that argument worked, it would also prove that contributing to a Kickstarter is irrational – at least in cases where the total amount needed to be raised is significantly larger than the amount of one’s contribution. An example would be the Veronica Mars movie project, which raised five million dollars on Kickstarter; the average donation size was reportedly around $60. The odds that an individual’s personal $60 contribution will make the difference to a multi-million-dollar movie’s being made or not is vanishingly small; hence if not making a difference to the outcome is a reason not to vote, it’s also a reason not to contribute to a Kickstarter (except when the amount to be raised is small enough, or the amount one can personally contribute is large enough, that one’s contribution can significantly alter the probability of the project’s being funded).
Yet I suspect that among libertarians sympathetic to argument (c), few will be willing to issue a similar rejection of Kickstarter (or similar services). After all, Kickstarter is a libertarian’s dream; in the words of Reason editor Nick Gillespie, it “allows creators and funders to escape conventional financial, ideological and aesthetic gatekeepers who have long suppressed heterodoxy in media, business, the arts and more.” The ability to evade such gatekeepers is obviously a major benefit to libertarians and other politically heterodox thinkers.
Worse yet, if argument (c) worked against voting, it would also tell against being a libertarian activist as such, since (as noted elsewhere) “no one libertarian activist’s contribution is likely to make the crucial difference as to whether libertarianism triumphs or not.”
The truth is that civilisation depends on people contributing, in thousands of small ways every day, to practices whose maintenance will not stand or fall with any individual such contribution. Thankfully, people contribute to public goods all the time – and do so voluntarily, rational-choice arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. (See, for example, “Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible” by Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, and Roy Gardner.)
And the same is true at an individual level; my success at any personal project depends on my reliably contributing to it over and over, even though success does not depend on any one of those instances, and so each individual contribution can look irrational. But if it were indeed irrational, then it would likewise be irrational to undertake any project that can’t be completed instantaneously – which is absurd.
The crucial fact to recognise is that we have an imperfect duty to contribute to public goods. (For a defense of the claim that we have such a duty, and that it is an imperfect duty, see my article “On Making Small Contributions to Evil.”) An imperfect duty, remember, is not optional or supererogatory; it’s a full-fledged duty. But it’s a duty that can be satisfied by performing the relevant action merely regularly rather than at every opportunity, leaving the agent with a free choice as to the occasions on which she discharges that duty. A duty to contribute to public goods, then, is not a duty to contribute to any and every public good that comes along; one can choose which ones to support.
Suppose I think that of two major political candidates, one of them (say, Hilnald Clump) is a bit less bad than the other (say, Donnary Trinton). Then I might regard a Clump victory as a public good, and might accordingly choose to vote for Clump as one of the instances in which I fulfill my duty to contribute to public goods. Hence the mere fact that the outcome of the election will not be affected by my individual vote does not render voting irrational.
To be sure, this argument does not generate a duty to vote, contrary to position (a). After all, even if one regards a Clump victory as a public good (given the alternative of the even more odious Trinton), the duty to contribute to public goods is an imperfect duty, and one need not choose this particular occasion as one to count toward fulfilling that duty. All the same, the argument does show how voting could be a way of fulfilling a duty, and so does give some aid and comfort to the pro-voting side, supporting a weaker version of position (a).
But it may give less support even to the weaker version of (a) than meets the eye. And in particular it may not give much support to (b). Let’s look closer.
Suppose there’s a third-party candidate – perhaps Gill Stohnson or Jary Jein – whom you regard as less bad than either of the two major candidates, but the third-party candidate has no chance of winning. Is voting for the least bad of the major candidates, rather than for the third-party candidate, the best way of fulfilling your duty?
Not obviously. After all, if you vote the way you’d prefer everyone to vote, as though you were choosing for everyone, then you should choose the third-party candidate. And if someone responds that it’s irrational to act as though you’re choosing for everyone, since in fact everyone else is going to vote however they’re going to vote regardless of what you do, that argument proves too much, since it’s an equally good reason not to vote at all; in fact it’s just the same voting-is-irrational argument (c) over again.
And once one considers what other results one might be contributing to besides someone’s simply getting elected, the case for voting third-party looks even stronger. After all, the larger the margin by which a candidate wins, the more that candidate can get away with claiming a mandate, thus putting him or her in a stronger political position to get favoured policies enacted. So if one thinks that both of the major candidates would do more harm than good if elected (even if one is worse than the other), then making the winning candidate’s totals smaller becomes a public good to which one might choose to contribute – perhaps by voting for a third-party candidate (though also, perhaps, by voting for whichever of the major candidates one thinks is most likely to lose).
Moreover, if you think that higher vote totals for a third-party candidate are a good thing even if that candidate doesn’t win (e.g., by garnering more publicity for alternative candidates and thus helping to build future support for a political movement you favour, sending a message of disenchantment with the political establishment, etc.), then voting for that candidate contributes to a public good other than just that candidate’s getting elected. Plus your total percentage contribution to the desired end will be greater, both because the number of voters you’re cooperating with will be smaller and because the result is incremental rather than all-or-nothing. All other things being equal, it seems plausible that the case for contributing to a public good gets stronger as the degree of impact of that contribution increases.
So whatever pro-voting case can be extracted from my argument seems more favorable to voting for third-party candidates (when they’re better than the major candidates) than to voting for a major candidate. There seems to be no strong case for position (b).
But in fact the case for voting third-party is not all that strong either; indeed, the problems with (b) turn out to be problems for (a) as well. Suppose your favoured third-party candidate, while better than either of the two major candidates, is still fairly lousy (in your view). Then the message you’re sending, and the cause you’re supporting, are a muddled mixture of good and bad. You might well contribute more effectively and unambiguously to the public good you seek by writing a clear and compelling op-ed or blog post rather than voting for a mixed-bag candidate.
Finally, suppose you’re an anarchist (as you should be). Trying to achieve anarchy via the route of electoral politics seems a lot less promising strategically than the agorist approach of building alternative institutions and trying to win people’s affiliation to those institutions and away from the state; the former requires convincing 51% of the electorate in order to accomplish anything, while the latter makes room for incremental success at the margin. Moreover, just as high vote totals for the winning candidate will be interpreted as a mandate for that candidate, so high vote totals in general will be regarded as a mandate for the system – whereas what we as anarchists should be seeking to do is to deligitimise the system.
In the light of those considerations, refraining from voting, thereby doing one’s part to deemphasise the importance of electoral politics in the wider culture, starts to looks like a better contribution to a public good than voting does.
And that’s why I’ll be boycotting the vote this Tuesday.
I’m pleased to announce that the 2008 anthology Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country?, edited by the late Tibor Machan and myself, is about to be released in paperback from Routledge (formerly Ashgate). It’s scheduled for the end of November, but can be pre-ordered now at Amazon (US here, Canada here, UK here).
At $55 it’s still a hefty pricetag, but it beats the hardback cost, which varies between $100 and $150.
- Lester Hunt: “Why the State Needs a Justification”
Roger Lee: “Libertarianism, Limited Government, and Anarchy”
Adam Reed: “Rationality, History, and Inductive Politics”
William Thomas: “Objectivism Against Anarchy”
Tibor Machan: “Reconciling Anarchism and Minarchism”
Aeon Skoble: “Radical Freedom and Social Living”
Jan Narveson: “The State: From Minarchy to Anarchy”
John Hasnas: “The Obviousness of Anarchy”
Roderick Long: “Market Anarchism As Constitutionalism”
Charles Johnson: “Liberty, Equality, Solidarity: Toward a Dialectical Anarchism”
Here are a couple of reviews of the original hardback edition:
This volume is a much needed revival of a debate critical to Libertarians, but also of significance to political theorists generally. The issue itself goes to the heart of what it means to do political philosophy, and the contributions found here skillfully keep those basic concerns in sight. In addition, I found the writing lucid and fair minded – something often missing in scholarly debate anthologies. I have no doubt that this volume will become a standard reference source for those interested in this particular debate and among the sources one consults when considering the foundations of the state generally.
– Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty Fund
The forceful philosophical and historical challenges to the state presented in this volume should be read not just by libertarians, but by everyone who believes that government is either necessary or legitimate.
– Elaine Sternberg, London School of Economics
I’m glad the essays in this volume will now be likely to reach at least a slightly larger audience.
[cross-posted at BHL]
I neglected to post about this while it was actually happening, but I just finished participating in a Cato Unbound exchange on Immanuel Kant’s place in classical liberalism – with digressions on, inter alia, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rand. My interlocutors were a Kantian and two Randians.
Reading it is categorically imperative! Catch the phenomenal action here.
This Wednesday (so either tomorrow or today, depending on your time zone) the Auburn Philosophy Club will be hosting a public panel on happiness at 5:00 at Mama Mocha’s coffeeshop (414 S. Gay St.); details here. My contribution will be to argue that Kant’s arguments against happiness-focused theories of morality, while they may work against some versions of that approach, don’t succeed against the ancient Greek versions (as represented, e.g., by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics).
So the aforementioned website glitch is solved, and Praxeology.net (along with the Molinari and ALL pages) is back up.
As Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) requested, I downloaded my files through FileZilla and scanned them for malware, but detected none; and their tech “support” line (after hours on hold listening to their horrible music loop) couldn’t tell me which files were infected.
However, since the most likely website vulnerability is WordPress files, and I haven’t used WordPress on that site since Brandon rescued my blog from Yahoo (may they also be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) back in 2008, I just deleted all the WordPress files, and that did the trick. Website’s back!
At the same time that I’ve been having this website problem, I’ve also been having another, unrelated problem, this one with the Alabama Philosophical Society website, AlPhilSoc.org. Here again the culprit is Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity). Y’see, Yahoo (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) recently transferred all its websites to its newly extruded appendage Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity), also apparently known as Luminate (likewise damned). So I had to create a new account with Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) for AlPhilSoc.org.
Now when I first created AlPhilSoc.org (or GeoCities.com/AlPhilSoc, as it was then) back in 2000, for some reason I gave an address at cyberspace.org as my contact email. That was a very old email account of mine – in fact it was the first email account I ever had, from 1994. In any case, I soon changed my contact email to my current address, and I had no reason to think cyberspace.org was still associated with my account. All the AlPhilSoc announcements came to my current address, and when I looked in my account info online, the only email contact listed was my current address.
But when I went to update the AlPhilSoc account with Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity), for some reason their system was convinced that the one and only contact email for me was the one at cyberspace.org, and that was the only address they would send their verification notice to – even though Yahoo (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) still listed the right address in the part of my AlPhilSoc account still hosted with them. Since I no longer had access to my cyberspace.org account – it had long ago been deleted – this meant that there was no way to access the AlPhilSoc site to update it. The tech “support” line for Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) told me there was nothing they could do.
Happily, I found a solution. Although my cyberspace.org account was gone, luckily no one had created a new account with the same username. So I created a new cyberspace.org account (not easily – cyberspace.org doesn’t support webmail, so I had to wrestle with SSL and IMAP and PuTTY, which I know from nuthin), chose my old username, and prompted Aabaco (may they be damned to the lowest circle of hell for all eternity) to send their verification email once more to the cyberspace.org address. This time I could answer and respond to it, and so I have access to AlPhilSoc.org once more. I’ve just updated it with info about the next APS meeting; see my next post.