I’m back from Bryn Mawr. It was a great conference; but no rest for me: Mises U. begins tonight!
The shuttle from Atlanta was fuller than usual last night; and given that the passengers were all talking about praxeology, nullification, and central banking, I suspect I know what they’re in town for.
The Empirical Me
I’m Roderick T. Long, Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University. I’m an Aristotelean/Wittgensteinian in philosophy and a left-libertarian market anarchist in social theory. (More about me here.) This blog, Austro-Athenian Empire, is a continuation of my earlier blog, archived here.
[...]I suspect I know what they’re in town for.
Libetarian/conservative/Republican fusionism?
As we all know Republicans just can’t get enough of talking about praxeology, nullification and central banking.
Most so-called “Misesians” and “Hayekians” use Republicans to advance an empty form of praxeology. Republicans just dance in accord with the strings.
I haven’t noticed that, other than the Ron Paul fetishism. Do you know of other examples?
Well, (party boss) Rush Limbaugh explicitly endorses Hayekianism. I’ll let you judge whether or not his echoes influence the conservative movement. Take away him and the tea baggers and you tell me what remains on the right… And I’m assuming the religious right couldn’t stand on its own.
I doubt that Limbaugh (or Beck) has read much of Hayek’s praxeological stuff such as Counter-revolution of Science or “Facts of the Social Sciences.” If he’s really read any Hayek it’s probably Road to Serfdom (Hayek’s most famous book but hardly his most interesting, and certainly not especially praxeological).
That’s probably true. But Hayek’s praxeology is implicit in nearly all his work. So the broad shout-outs to Hayek by Limbaugh and co. are implicit endorsements of his praxeology.
Would you say that Hayek keeps praxeology welded to thymology in the way you suggest is necessary for coherence?
That seems like a stretch to me. What Limbaugh & co. like in Hayek is the conclusions (or what they take to be the conclusions); I doubt that they even followed the arguments very closely.
Most of the time.
MBH,
JOR, how do you make sense of action without understanding?
I don’t think you do. When you “do” pure praxeology, the thymology is still “there”, enabling you – just like when you “do” geology, basic spacial understanding is still there in the background, allowing you and everyone else to begin to grasp what the hell you’re talking about. You’re just not “doing” thymology at the time (i.e. talking about any particular actions any particular actors are taking).
I don’t think doing thymology badly is akin to thinking illogically. I’d say you can’t do thymology “unpraxeologically” (ugh), just like you can’t think illogically. But you can do thymology (or thinking!) badly – even very badly. For instance, you can in the course of thymology rely (wittingly or not) on unreliable data on what actions people have taken or are taking, or veer off into projecting fanciful stuff into people’s inner souls or wild speculations about their Innate Time Preference. You can build theoretical models that assume to be human universals what are actually mere conventions or psychological idosyncrasies (or that go wrong more subtly by taking something that really is a universal and taking it to explain or encompass more than it really does; e.g. everyone economizes but models that depend on homo oeconomicus are nevertheless unhelpful), or that (in good faith or bad) incorporate causal explanations that are simply false.
As to Republicans using Misesians or Hayekians – at most they appeal to watered down versions of conclusions that Misesians and Hayekians share with other minarchists, and only when trying to sell themselves as pro-liberty. I’ve never seen a mainstream Republican even use the words “praxeology” or “thymology”, let alone have any clue what they mean or consciously use them to justify anything.
I meant geometry….
But you can do thymology (or thinking!) badly – even very badly.
I don’t say you can’t. I’m only saying that certain ideas make verstehen impossible. If you allow for polylogism, then verstehen can’t operate without catastrophic doubt.
As to Republicans using Misesians or Hayekians – at most they appeal to watered down versions of conclusions that Misesians and Hayekians share with other minarchists, and only when trying to sell themselves as pro-liberty.
Except for mystery guest Andrew Napolitano who couldn’t help but reference Fox News several times in his presentation.
I wonder if the title is a homage to Gandalf in “The Two Towers”, to Sheridan in Babylon 5, or to some other literary or biblical figure.
You mean “one _____ ends, another begins”? It’s a pretty common phrase.
Just posting to say the browser/OS tags are an interesting touch. That’s all.
Seconded.
Most Republican types have, at most, what might generously be called a passing familiarity with Hayek (they’ve read and sort of remember parts of Road to Serfdom, or at least heard someone who agrees with them about some economic-y stuff say nice things about it) and don’t have a single clue what praxeology is, and might possibly have strong opinions one way or another on nullification and central banking if they spent any time learning about them, but they don’t.
I certainly haven’t noticed any strong tendency of self-described Misesians or Hayekians shilling for Republicans, at least after Dubya came along and made them all feel stupid for taking them seriously during the Clinton years. Unless you count Ron (and to a lesser degree Rand) Paul, but much as the two of them might wish they’re not exactly mainstream Republicans.
And when the LvMI/LRC folks are carrying the panoply of the likes of the Pauls, whatever else is objectionable about it (and it is quite silly and tiresome), it seems weird to say they’re advancing an empty form of praxeology, except in the least interesting sense (i.e. the sense in which we’re all doing praxeology to some degree any time we talk about people doing stuff; so I guess anyone who talks about people doing stuff in a shallow or otherwise stupid way is sort of advancing an empty form of praxeology, but that seems like an awkward way to frame any criticism of what they’re doing). Maybe they’re pushing an empty form of libertarianism, but libertarianism does not equal praxeology; most of the great theoretical work done in praxeology has been done by guys who weren’t particularly libertarian (including the early Austrians up to and including Mises and Hayek, but especially if you want to include the work of Greco-Roman and Medieval philosophers).
The empty kind of praxeology I’m referencing is any praxeology detached from thymology. Misesians and Hayekians endorse thymology-less praxeology or, at the very least, praxeology with no regard for egalitarianism. I think that’s, at best, a dangerous and incomplete framework.
Re: “praxeology with no regard for egalitarianism”
Isn’t praxeology supposed to be value free? Therefore praxeology shouldn’t have, by definition, “regard” for egalitarianism or any other normative position. Correct or am I missing something?
You assume that egalitarianism is a value and not a fact.
Hmm. What do you mean by “egalitarianism” in this context?
That reasons for action can only derive from a third-person perspective.
I’m not clear on what you mean to say by the proposition above. In fact, I can’t make heads or tail of it (not that I blame you for that).
I’ll say more when I have access to my desktop later.
Thanks!
First, let me address what I mean by “Misesians and Hayekians endorse thymology-less praxeology.” I’ll say what I mean by egalitarianism-as-fact in another post.
This is a raw all-too-brief interpretation of Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action with a few of my own spices added.
(1) Understanding is the method of thymology.
(2) To understand anything, that which understands and that which is understood must operate by the same logic.
(3) Mises and Hayek grant the possibility of things that understand by a logic that does not match the logic of that which is understood.
(4) Mises and Hayek allow for a contradictory notion of understanding [from (2) and (3)].
(5) Mises and Hayek offer no thymology [from (1) and (4)].
I should add:
(4a) Contradictory notions of understanding is to thymology as illogic is to thought.
(4b) Illogic rules out thought.
So 5 is [from (1), (4), (4a), and (4b)].
I don’t see that they do any such thing. It’s true that a lot of Austrians believe you can do work in praxeological theory without “doing” thymology (I happen to agree with them), but nobody I know of who is comfortable with the terms thinks you can “apply” praxeology to analysis of actual events without doing thymology. Now it’s true that a lot of Misesians and Hayekians do thymology very badly (not quite as badly as most other economists, but still); even Mises has a tendency to slide off into bizarre fits of fanciful psychoanalysis (see The Anticapitalist Mentality). But when they do this stuff they’re not using Republicans towards the purpose.
But when they do this stuff they’re not using Republicans towards the purpose.
Fair enough. Republicans are using them.
Now it’s true that a lot of Misesians and Hayekians do thymology very badly[...]
As I show above, they don’t just do it badly, they don’t even count as doing it — even though they imagine they are.
What you’re saying is grammatically analogous to saying that “some people think illogically.” Illogic rules out thought. In the same way, contradictory notions of understanding rules out thymology.
JOR, how do you make sense of action without understanding? How is thymology to praxeology not as concept is to experience?
What’s the argument for (3)?
(3a) Mises explicitly describes the possibility of creatures like us that operate by a separate logic from ours.
(3b) Hayek believes the truths of praxeology are analytic a priori which implies impositionism which implies an external world that may or may not operate by a separate logic from ours.
Wait, what? What makes you think that believing:
(PAA) Praxeological judgments are analytic and apriori judgments
implies impositionism about praxeology? That would only follow if analytical apriori judgments are all imposed; but non-impositionists don’t believe that they are.
Frege believes that:
(AAA) Arithmetical judgments are analytic and apriori.
But if that’s supposed to imply that Frege is an impositionist about arithmetic, you must have a different understanding of Frege than I do.
The impositionist reading of Kant (which I think is the wrong reading, but it is a reading) doesn’t generally hold that analytic apriori judgments are the things that are imposed on the thing-in-itself, either. What Kantian impositionists are interested in are synthetic apriori judgments.
Arithmetical judgments are analytic and apriori[...] But if that’s supposed to imply that Frege is an impositionist about arithmetic, you must have a different understanding of Frege than I do.
I read it like this: if an author’s notion of the analytic entails a dichotomy between the synthetic and the analytic, then that author’s endorsement of analytic a priori judgments implies impositionism. However, if the author understands the analytic as a one side of a continuum — the other side being synthetic — then to endorse analytic a priori judgments is not to imply impositionism.
I certainly don’t read Frege as an impositionist. I think he’s starting the project that Wittgenstein finishes: discarding both impositionism and reflectionism.
What makes you think that believing: (PAA) Praxeological judgments are analytic and apriori judgments implies impositionism about praxeology?
I don’t believe that it does. The question is whether or not the way Hayek understands analytic a priori implies impositionism. If he thinks of the analytic as one side of a continuum — with the synthetic on the other side — then I will retract my argument. But I don’t think he makes that case.
MBH:
O.K., but why do you read it like that? What’s the argument for holding that, under an analytic-synthetic dichotomy, analytic apriori judgments are imposed?
Your reading doesn’t seem to help you out much with Frege: Frege definitely endorses a version of the synthetic-analytic dichotomy (he thinks that Kant was wrong in characterizing arithmetical judgments as synthetic, but he explicitly agrees with Kant that geometrical judgments are synthetic apriori). Maybe I missed it somewhere, but I also know of nowhere that Frege suggests that the division between the two is anything like a “continuum.” Wittgenstein certainly gets many things from Frege, but I don’t know of any sign of Frege specifically suggesting much of anything like the later Wittgenstein’s concerns about projectibility or enabling conditions for the application of concepts. If he does, could you show me where he does?
Unless I’m missing something, it seems like Frege meets your conditions for impositionism about analytic apriori judgments. But it seems to me that that’s would be a very peculiar assessment of Frege’s views, and you’d need to offer some very strong reasons to support it. If Frege is a party to the impositionist-reflectionist debate, then it seems to me that his notions of logic and its relationship to an eternal, non-material, non-psychological, objectively graspable Third Realm place him obviously and completely in the reflectionist camp, not the impositionist camp — at least, about the judgments of arithmetic.
Or, to go to the daddy of this whole analytic-synthetic business, Kant, when read as an impositionist, is, again, plenty big on a rigid dichotomy, but he’s not an impositionist about analytic apriori judgments. The whole point of the exercise, on impositionist readings of the critique, is that synthetic apriori judgments are imposed. Analytic apriori judgments don’t need to be; Kant never suggests that there is any particularly fancy story that has to be told about them.
What’s the argument for holding that, under an analytic-synthetic dichotomy, analytic apriori judgments are imposed?
(1)* The analytic-synthetic dichotomy implies psychologism.
(2) Under psychologism, if p entails q, then the belief in p will cause the belief in q.
(3) Believing = Seeing. (You can only see what you believe is there.)
(4) If p entails q, then an analytic a priori judgment that p allows for the perception that q [from (2) and (3)].
(5) A judgment that allows a perception — that would otherwise be disallowed — is an imposition.
(6) Under psychologism, analytic a priori judgments can allow/disallow perception.
(7) Psychologism implies imposition [from (5) and (6)].
(8) The analytic-synthetic dichotomy implies imposition [from (1) and (7)].
(9) Any kind of judgment under the analytic-synthetic dichotomy implies imposition.
(10) Analytic a priori judgments imply imposition.
Frege definitely endorses a version of the synthetic-analytic dichotomy[...]
Maybe on the surface he does. I’ll take your word for it. But his destruction of psychologism hammers the synthetic and the analytic together.
*(1a) If an analytic-synthetic continuum is the case, then a belief that p will not necessarily cause a belief in all that p entails. For instance, p may entail q but q may be believed because of empirical evidence that q — not automatically by the belief that p.
(1b) An analytic-synthetic continuum is a frame that disallows psychologism.
(10) is incomplete. It should read:
(10) Under the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, analytic a priori judgments imply imposition.
But no psychologician ever claimed that these causal connections are invariable.
But nothing, for the psychologician, can necessarily change independent of already-existent beliefs. I don’t see how that escapes the mild version of impositionism I described.
The more I think about, (9) is too broad if you believe it implies an a priori/a posteriori dichotomy (even though that’s false too).
(9) Any kind of judgment under the analytic-synthetic dichotomy implies imposition.
Under the analytic-synthetic dichotomy analytic and synthetic a posteriori judgments imply reflectionism — not impositionism.
It should read: (9) Any kind of a priori judgment under the analytic-synthetic dichotomy implies imposition.
MBH:
Alright, but what’s the argument for that? Are (1a) and (1b) below:
… supposed to be a lemma to establish that (1) is true? If so, then it seems that you’ve just given me the following argument:
… which is simply a formal fallacy. Am I missing something? If so, what? If not, how is this any kind of argument for premise (1)?
I don’t know of any psychologicians who believe that this is true in the unqualified form you’ve just stated it. (For example, lots of people believe some stuff about probability which is sufficient to prove that switching is a winning strategy in Monty Hall scenarios. But very few of them believe that switching is a winning strategy, unless you try very hard to show them how this can be so. Psychologicians don’t expect that people who believe in a set of premises always as a result believe in everything that the premises jointly entail! In fact, they more or less always (1) qualify the claim by saying that the causal connection only holds under a set of ideal conditions for cognition (e.g., the believer has to have time to think about it, has to be paying attention, etc.) and (2) insist that the causal connection between believing that p, and believing in q, under those ideal conditions, is in any case only an empirical generalization, which may admit of exceptions, not a necessary connection. But if anything, genuine impositionists (like the impositionist reading of Kant, or like Mises) want to insist on a necessary relationship, not an empirical generalization; which is part of the reason why so many of them (Impositionist-Kant, Mises) tend to be so fiercely anti-psychologistic.
; they generally hold that this kind of epistemic closure is qualified by a set of normative cognitive conditions (the believer has to have adequate time to think, a certain degree of intelligence, etc.), and, furthermore, they hold that this causal relationship between believing that p and believing that q, under the normative is an empirical generalization which may admit of exceptions, not a necessary connection or universal law.
I have no idea what you mean by this. = suggests equivalence or identity; but your parenthetical gloss looks like a statement of necessary conditions. In any case, when you say “seeing,” are you actually referring to sight here? I.e., is (3) intended to say exactly that S counts as (literally) seeing O only if S believes that O exists? That’s what your later references to perception seem to suggest. But if so, then when you come to:
… you’re stuck with a real hot mess. I guess this is intended to be a simple conditional within a pair of universal quantifiers over all p and all q, but in order to actually get this anywhere near being adequately formulated, you’d actually embedding a lot more in the way of conditionals and quantifiers (e.g., “an analytic a priori judgment that p allows for…” is going to mean something like, “If p entails q, then: if q is an observation report of some S seeing some O, then (it is possible for q to be perceived if: p is an analytic judgment and there is an apriori justification for p).” But in the rest of your argument, you fallaciously convert the italicitzed “if” to an “only if” (by introducing a “would otherwise be disallowed” that was nowhere in the previous premise); you also act as if you already have all the antecedents of these embedded conditionals already satisfied, and can proceed to assert conclusions that you inferred from the consequent (that a perception that q is presupposing a belief that p). But you haven’t satisfied them. You’ll need to actually give an example of (1) a p which is an analytic judgment with an apriori justification; (2) a q which is an observation report to the effect that some S sees some O; and then (3) show that that analytic truth logically entails that observation report (!). Which seems to me something you’re not likely to be able to do; that’s not the sort of thing that analytic truths normally entail. But if you don’t have at least one p and a q you can give us, then you have no basis for inferring (6); you’re just asserting something you inferred from the consequent without first having satisfied the antecedent of the conditional.
Or maybe you meant something else by “allows for the perception” than this sort of observation-report, but then it’s not clear at all how (4) is supposed to be connected with the previous premise in (3), if (3) is supposed to have something to do with the factivity of seeing. Of course, as I said, I’m really pretty baffled as to what (3) is supposed to be saying; so perhaps (3) also means something different, which is connected. But what, then?
Me:
MBH:
Well, you don’t need to take my word for it. He discusses it in Foundations of Arithmetic, among other places.
That’s fair.
S can perceive O if and only if S can apply the concept O.
Analytic a priori judgments under ASD and AAD cannot reference experience.
S cannot apply the concept O under ASD and AAD.
S cannot perceive O with analytic a priori judgments.
Action is an object of perception.
S cannot perceive A with analytic a priori judgments.
A set of “truths” that cannot be perceived are not truths.
Praxeological truths cannot be merely analytic a priori under ASD as Hayek thought.
But then, Roderick already said that. Fuck it. I’m going to bed.
Ah! But that does serve as a replacement for (3b) way back here.
So I stand by the claim that Mises and Hayek offer no thymology. Ballin!
Isn’t praxeology and thymology inseparable aspects of a single concept, thymology being the application of praxeology?
If that’s right, then if Mises and Hayek didn’t do thymology they wouldn’t even possess the concept of praxeology in the first place, since possessing a concept is applying it. So, i think you’re beating a strawman.
By the way, i didn’t quite get your “understanding is the method of thymology”. Could you elaborate? I always thought praxeology was the method of thymology, thymology being the praxeological understanding of particular cases.
P.S.: what about your “egalitarianism-as-fact”?
Isn’t praxeology and thymology inseparable aspects of a single concept, thymology being the application of praxeology?
That’s misleading. Praxeology is the logic of action. Thymology is the processing of that logic with the same logic. “A is to B as C is to D” is an example of thymology. But opening the door to polylogism, as Mises and Hayek do, contaminates what would otherwise count as thymology. Through an acceptance of polylogism, “A is to B as C might be to D… if only we knew how things were in themselves.” No praxeology can consistently stand on that foundation. And that’s the foundation Mises and Hayek lay out.
If that’s right, then if Mises and Hayek didn’t do thymology they wouldn’t even possess the concept of praxeology in the first place, since possessing a concept is applying it.
Well, I don’t think they necessarily count as possessing the concept of praxeology. They count as pointing in the direction of the concept. They’re barking up the right tree.
P.S.: what about your “egalitarianism-as-fact”?
It’s probably something that has to be shown. But I’ll give it a shot:
(1) Language represents the shared intercourse of mental processing.
(2) The words “I” and “you” are merely indexical.
(3) Reasons for action cannot include the privilege of one indexical from one perspective over the same indexical from another perspective.
(4) “I need X” gives “you” as much reason to supply X if “you” make the proposition as it does if “I” make the proposition [from (2) and (3)].
(5) No one’s “I” can ever justifiably dissociate from shared intercourse [from (1) and (4)].
MBH,
If reasons for action can only derive from a third-person perspective, then how is it that pain can be a reason for action, when pain is a subjective experience?
Pain is an inter-subjective experience. Phenomenologically, almost everyone’s familiar with the wave of shock that runs through the body when you see something excruciating happen to a friend. Neurologically, mirror neurons fire at a rate that registers the emotions of another person pre-consciously. And philosophically, compelling arguments have been made that utterances like “ouch!” are not mere representations of pain but actually exist on a continuum of pain itself — those utterances can present pain. Take a young child for instance. If she falls while running and those around her say “ohhhh no! are you hurt?” she’s more likely to experience pain than if those around her say “yay! way to go!” and cheer and laugh.
I do take your point though smally. It would make more sense to say that “reasons for action must derive from a third person and a second person perspective.” And while we’re at it, we could always get a little more jiggy with it and say, “reasons for action from a first person perspective are only justified if they coincide with the reasons from a second and third person perspective.”
“That’s misleading. Praxeology is the logic of action. Thymology is the processing of that logic with the same logic. “A is to B as C is to D” is an example of thymology. ”
As I was saying: Thymology is the application of praxeology. Or what else could you mean by “the processing of that logic with the same logic”? Thymology just IS the understanding. It’s not like the method of thymology is understanding, the method of thymology is praxeology.
“A is to B as C is to D” is thymology? It seems like what you’re saying is that thymology is to understand the meaning of concepts. Is that correct? I always thought that thymology is to understand an action…. I mean, I know that the meaning of concepts is their use, so what you’re saying is that thymology could be “to understand the meaning of a concept” among other things? (I might have just misunderstood you. English is not my natural language)
I think we should say: “acting is to praxeology as thinking is to logic”. To logically analyse a sentence is analogous to praxeologically understand an action. And thymology just means: “to praxeologically understand”.
Since the first time we act (or understand an action), we already have the conceptual truths of praxeology implicitly. Just like since the first time we think (or analyse a thought) we already have the conceptual truths of logic implicitly.
So, what I want to say is: Mises and Hayek could never count as not possessing the concept of praxeology. No one could! What you could say is that they make mistakes when they’re trying to make explicit the conceptual truths of praxeology. But I don’t think you’re saying that, or are you?
It’s not like there is a type of praxeology: “the empty type”. What Long is trying to say is that there is no such thing as praxeology without thymology, and vice-versa. If you accept the conceptual truths of praxeology that Mises shows us, how could you say he doesn’t possess the concept?
“But opening the door to polylogism, as Mises and Hayek do, contaminates what would otherwise count as thymology.”
Pollylogism doesn’t contaminate thymology, since thymology is just the verstehen of action, which already employs the concept of praxeology. In fact, pollylogism contaminates absolutely nothing:
It’s not like pollylogism makes sense! Pollylogism is nonsense. So when you’re saying “M. and H. opened the door to pollylogism” you’re saying they opened the door to WHAT? to nonsense? But nonsense is nonsense!
Just because Mises’ and Hayek’s epistemological justifications make it possible, it doesn’t mean that their theory is contaminated by pollylogism, since we can’t even make sense of what would be another logic, so we wouldn’t be able to even make sense of their theory.
“Through an acceptance of polylogism, “A is to B as C might be to D… if only we knew how things were in themselves.” No praxeology can consistently stand on that foundation. And that’s the foundation Mises and Hayek lay out.”
But that’s “just” the philosophical foundations. As I said, there’s no serious consequence to the rest of their work.
Where in their theory they applied praxeology to history in that way?
About you egalitarianism-as-a-fact, i still didn’t quite get it. Are you saying that value is agent-neutral?
Think of it like this:
The first-person perspective is the home of natural science.
The second-person perspective is the home of thymology.
The third-person perpective is the home of praxeology.
I want to say that these three perspectives are all interacting inside a single network. To lose sight of their interconnection is to lose grasp of the individual concepts. Agreed?
How can you separate praxeology from thymology in that way? No, i don’t think thymology is the second-person perspective while praxeology is the third person-perspective. Because I can’t make sense of that. Please be more clear. I’m not saying you’re wrong, but I need a more detailed explanation.
What “X is the y-person perspective” means in this context?
That’s the best I can do from a phone. I’ll unpack those ideas when I get home.
“A is to B as C is to D” is thymology? It seems like what you’re saying is that thymology is to understand the meaning of concepts. Is that correct?
Thymology is understanding the world/something in the world from another person’s perspective. Say that Larry enjoys ice cream more than any other food. Bill enjoys pizza more than any other food. Bill tells Larry “pizza is my favorite food.” Larry would be doing thymology if he processes that statement as “pizza is to Bill as ice cream is to me.”
Mises and Hayek could never count as not possessing the concept of praxeology. No one could!
That’s not true. To grasp praxeology, you also need to understand its relation to thymology and the natural sciences. Without praxeology’s connection to the natural sciences, an end like flapping-your-arms-and-flying-to-the-moon is no less coherent than an end like taking-a-sip-of-water-from-this-glass. Without praxeology’s connection to thymology, you P. are the only actor in the world.
As long as you’re attempting to do praxeology without thymology or the natural sciences, you’re at least temporarily without the concept.
Pollylogism doesn’t contaminate thymology, since thymology is just the verstehen of action, which already employs the concept of praxeology.
But you cannot exercise verstehen on someone operating by a different logic. If polylogism is the case, then someone like us could do X at time t, but have preferred Y at time t. If that’s possible, then praxeology isn’t possible.
Pollylogism is nonsense. So when you’re saying “M. and H. opened the door to pollylogism” you’re saying they opened the door to WHAT? to nonsense? But nonsense is nonsense!
No. I’m saying they open the door to an idea that disables them from fully grasping the very concepts they take themselves to be describing.
Where in their theory they applied praxeology to history in that way?
Mises says that creatures like us could operate by a different logic, though they would quickly die out. For the sake of argument you can imagine that they are so much like us we couldn’t distinguish them from us. And you could also imagine that they hadn’t died out yet.
About you egalitarianism-as-a-fact, i still didn’t quite get it. Are you saying that value is agent-neutral?
I’m saying that agent-neutrality is a necessary perspective to evaluate reasons for action. Egalitarianism is a fact from that perspective.
How can you separate praxeology from thymology in that way?
I’m not separating it. I’m pointing out that without understanding action, you can’t register it as action. I say that the two are interconnected.
No, i don’t think thymology is the second-person perspective while praxeology is the third person-perspective.
To do thymology, you have to imagine yourself in another person’s shoes. Habermas talks about this as an Ego/Alter process. You sort of take the role of another person’s Alter and say, “well that action was chosen because I (the other person) would believe X.” Ego/Alter is, by definition, a second-person perspective.
The language of praxeology is a third-person perspective. “Jones did X at time t. Therefore, Jones valued X at time t more than Y at time t.”
Natural science is a first-person perspective since it never says anything about the existence of other people.
Now I understand you. But I still disagree with you.
I don’t think that you have to imagine yourself in the other person’s perspective. You just have to apply praxeology to her action. Why should that require that I should, like, “enter his mind” or something?
“Understanding the world trough another person’s perspective” is misleading. I think we should just say:
“Thymology is understanding an action”.
Everyone (!) do thymology on a daily basis. In fact, you cannot possess a language without doing thymology. That’s why I thought you said thymology is to understand the meaning of concepts. To grasp the meaning of a concept is to understand praxeologically the uses of that concept in a language-game.
So, how could someone not do thymology, hence, not possess the concept of praxeology, at least, IMPLICITLY, while possessing a language?
“To grasp praxeology, you also need to understand its relation to thymology and the natural sciences.”
I disagree.
First, It’s not like you need to “understand the relation to thymology” to grasp the meaning of praxeology. Thymology is just the application of praxeology! It is just by doing thymology that you possess the concept of praxeology.
Second, the Greeks didn’t know natural sciences (well, at least not as we do today), so how come they managed to set virtue ethics in a praxeological foundation?
Natural sciences are useful to praxeology, indeed, but it’s not like you need it to GRASP praxeology.
“Without praxeology’s connection to thymology, you P. are the only actor in the world.”
I disagree, since there is no such thing as a praxeology without connection to thymology. I want to say: To know that you’re acting necessarily pressupposes the knowledge of other actors, since I can have the concept of praxeology only by exercising thymology of an action that is not my own.
“As long as you’re attempting to do praxeology without thymology or the natural sciences, you’re at least temporarily without the concept.”
THAT’s our main disagreement. I think you should say: “You can’t make explicit the conceptual truths of praxeology”, or something like that. NOT: “you don’t possess the concept of praxeology”.
I can’t even make sense of “doing praxeology without thymology”. I think you mean: “Saying what the conceptual truths of praxeology are without having ever applied them implicitly to verstehen an action”.
But, in that case, what you’re saying doesn’t even make sense.
How could Mises and Hayek not possess the concept of praxeology and still able to talk about it.
“But you cannot exercise verstehen on someone operating by a different logic.”
I agree! But WHERE M. and H. tried to do that?
Answer: They never tried, because it’s impossible! We can’t even make sense of another logic.
That’s why I said: “Pollylogism doesn’t contaminate thymology, since thymology is just the verstehen of action, which already employs the concept of praxeology.”
“No. I’m saying they open the door to an idea that disables them from fully grasping the very concepts they take themselves to be describing.”
But that’s wrong. The only thing the idea does is to make their theory slightly less coherent. And we just need minor adjustments to make it cohere again.
“Mises says that creatures like us could operate by a different logic, though they would quickly die out. For the sake of argument you can imagine that they are so much like us we couldn’t distinguish them from us. And you could also imagine that they hadn’t died out yet.”
I know that. But where is he APPLYING praxeology here?
The notion of applying praxeology to creatures with a different logic than ours is contradictory. That’s what I’m trying to say to you.
So, that’s why I said it’s “just” the philosophical foundations. Because, in a certain way, It’s just a small detail in their whole theory.
“I’m saying that agent-neutrality is a necessary perspective to evaluate reasons for action. Egalitarianism is a fact from that perspective.”
Are you saying agent-neutrality about value is necessary?
Which means your “egalitarianism-as-a-fact” would amount to: “value is objective”.
I want to end with this suggestive sentence:
“Thymology means ‘the use of praxeology’”.
p.s.: Sorry for such a long post. By the way, how do i bold the words?
[...H]ow do i bold the words?
See here.
Thymology is just the application of praxeology!
Dude. No it isn’t. If you don’t believe me, you can ask Mises:
Thymology has no special relation to praxeology and economics. The very act of valuing is a thymological phenomenon. But praxeology and economics do not deal with the thymological aspects of valuation. Their theme is acting in accordance with the choices made by the actor. The concrete choice is an offshoot of valuing. But praxeology is not concerned with the events which within a man’s soul or mind or brain produce a definite decision between an A and a B. It takes it for granted that the nature of the universe enjoins upon man choosing between incompatible ends. Its subject is not the content of these acts of choosing but what results from them: action. It does not care about what a man chooses but
about the fact that he chooses and acts in compliance with a choice made. It is neutral with regard to the factors that determine the choice and does not arrogate to itself the competence to examine, to revise, or to correct judgments of value. It is wertfrei [value-free]. Why one man chooses water and another man wine is a thymological (or, in the traditional terminology, psychological) problem. But it is of no concern to praxeology and economics. (TH III. 12. 2.)
As far as Mises is concerned you can apply praxeology all day without touching thymology. I think you’re trying to load praxeology into thymology, or vice versa. But Roderick’s point is not that you have to load praxeology into thymology but to keep them side-by-side. I’m personally saying that praxeology, thymology, and whatever natural science the relevant user has access to, should all be side-by-side-by-side. I don’t know if Roderick agrees with that or not. I don’t see why he wouldn’t though. Roderick? Paging Roderick?
Wow. I really wish I made the Mises quote italicized instead of bold. Sorry ’bout that.
Thanks Brandon. You are an administrator par excellence.
I don’t understand this. You go on to say that it’s because “it never says anything about the existence of other people.” But it never says anything about oneself either.
This I don’t understand either. Praxeology and thymology both have to apply to all three; I don’t see how they could have the kind of separation you advocate.
I don’t understand this. You go on to say that it’s because “it never says anything about the existence of other people.” But it never says anything about oneself either.
I thought about that after I submitted it. But from the perspective of natural science (or at least logical positivism), realism = solipsism. It’s hard to say why the existence of a single mind that acts as immediate object is not a first-person perspective.
This I don’t understand either. Praxeology and thymology both have to apply to all three; I don’t see how they could have the kind of separation you advocate.
I agree that they apply to all three. But similarly, the analytic can apply to the synthetic with out finding its home in the synthetic — both are housed in logic. I’m not advocating any kind of real separation — just distinction. I take myself to be expanding your claim that praxeology and thymology must stay welded together. I’m just saying that if you want praxeology/thymology to talk about coherent ends, then natural science (going a step further than Mises’s natural psychology) should also be welded to the framework.
Well, but Mises is just wrong about that, as Long points out in his praxeological investigations.
Although now I got your point about the 2nd-person perspective, I still think this is somewhat misleading. I think we should say: Praxeology employs no perspective at all. Praxeology is just the method by which we can verstehen any action. So.. yes, I guess I’m still “loading praxeology into thymology, and vice-versa”, but I don’t think I’m wrong here.
If Mises never did any thymology he wouldn’t possess the concept of praxeology, and as I’ve been arguing, I think every language-user must possess it, at least implicitly.
So, what you’re saying is: “Mises usually does bad thymology in his books”, which would never make it impossible, or even difficult, to do a good job in “pure” praxelogy.
I remain unconvinced.
Praxeology employs no perspective at all.
Praxeology employs no obvious perspective. But let’s say that Roderick is right — which he is — that praxeology takes place in Frege’s third realm: a public non-sensory “space”.
We’re talking about something going on that’s publicly available. It’s not sensible to you. It’s not sensible to me. But it has to make sense for us to coherently talk about it. Is there a third option? Is there a third-person we could consult? What would our interaction and the dynamics that govern that interaction look like from their perspective? Do we have a conventional concept to describe this third-person’s perspective? Would that be useful?
I don’t get you. Are you saying the logical space of reasons (the grammatical space)is the 3rd-person perspective?
But, then… Is there any other perspective?
Btw, about the analytic/synthetic distinction: I thought it was consensus here that analytic/synthetic is a false dychotomy.
Are you saying the logical space of reasons (the grammatical space)is the 3rd-person perspective?
Insofar as the third-person perspective is objective, yes. In literature, there’s a distinction between third-person limited and third-person omniscient. The third-person limited is not in the grammatical space. The third-person omniscient is.
But, then… Is there any other perspective?
Why wouldn’t there be?
I thought it was consensus here that analytic/synthetic is a false dychotomy.
It is. Here. But not for Mises and Hayek.
[...] done with my two-week libertarathon – tiring but fun. Now just two weeks before fall classes [...]
“Why wouldn’t there be?”
Because I don’t really think the grammatical space is a perspective. I think its more appropriate to see it as the lens through which we view reality.
How is “a lens through which we view reality” not a point of view?
1- I take the grammatical space to be the same as: “the conceptual space”.
2- What I’m saying here is basically what McDowell said in his Mind and World: There’s no way around the conceptual space.
So, or I’m right about this, or I still didn’t get what you’re talking about.
So your question is: if no individual can view the world but through their concepts, then how is the conceptual “space” a point of view? Even if that “space” is used as a lens?
Or are you asking: if we all view the world through our concepts, then how is that not the only point of view? Even if we are all individuals and occupy different points of view?
I mean, I think I hear your objection. I just don’t see how it’s relevant. Even if McDowell is correct — which I grant, although he could be more clear about his position — there’s still a first-person, second-person, third-person limited, and third-person omniscient. The third-person omniscient is just all the concepts in all their uses.
Maybe my point really is off the target. To be honest, I just can make no sense of this whole “perspective” talk. Since I don’t want to keep bothering you with the same question, can you link me to some work that could explain what you mean by it?
I mean: Why would a concept be on the 1st perspective, another in 2nd perspective, and so on?
Since I don’t want to keep bothering you with the same question, can you link me to some work that could explain what you mean by it?
You’re looking at it. I’m not really using anything other than what I’ve read from McDowell, Roderick, and what I can remember from high school lit. I’m just trying to synthesize these concepts in ways that sharpen comprehension. Sounds like it’s not working. That’s probably my fault.
Why would a concept be on the 1st perspective, another in 2nd perspective, and so on?
Say that McDowell is right: conceptualism is true. It doesn’t make sense to talk about things-in-themselves. There’s no point in considering what the world is like independent of mind. The world, in a real sense, just is mind. Beyond that is just nonsense. We could blather about it. But we’d be better off trying to cook up a collective seizure (at least then we’d be aware of what we were aiming at).
Even if all that’s true, it still makes sense to talk about the frames of reference for different points of view and the concepts they entail. I don’t know if you’ve read The Tractatus but that’s what I take Wittgenstein to be doing. He’s laying out the logical positivist point of view. Towards the end it starts to become clear that this point of view just is the implicit framework for first-person perspective (“the world is my world”).
McDowell arguably discovers conceptualism through Wittgenstein. So, from a conceptualist perspective — if you’ll accept that there is such a thing — Wittgenstein is demonstrating how inadequate this single perspective — the first-person without any supplement — is. There has to be more frames of reference — other perspectives, other lenses — or else the world is just this dark lonely place. It’s necessary to have an understanding of what implicitly makes up these frames of reference so you can chose to switch at will. And concepts help us understand and choose between the different lenses (standpoints) available.
Does that help?