I Would Like A Glass of Wine, Vintage 2064, Please By Roderick on June 17, 2009 10 Whats clearly the most interesting entry on this list? My pick: #21 (not for the food content but for the upshot). (#41 would be a contender if it werent fictional.)
I don’t know. The doughtnut cheeseburgers look might tempting.
I just watched a technology lecture by David Friedman last night. He might encourage you to go for the 200064 Cabernet.
Totally separate note, I think:
Rothbard says that interpersonal exchange did not evolve out of autistic exchange. But we know that rescuing an unconscious person is not caught in either of these categories. So, I’m wondering what you think about this move here: we could say that interpersonal exchange evolved out of something like a Dionysian exchange (in Nietzsche’s sense–contrasted against the Apollonian or Crusoe, but not identical to the interactive). And when this mode of action occurs–rescuing an unconscious person–we can describe it as something like the *root* of interactive exchange/that from which interactive exchange evolved.
The Dionysian exchange could hold a lot of descriptive power. It’s without boundaries, but its flux entails movement and exchange. Is this a legal (in the customary sense) move to make?
I’m inclined to doubt that any of these exchanges “evolved out of” or are the “root” of any of the others. Any society of rational agents is going to have both autistic and interpersonal exchanges from the start; and if they’re born as infants there are going to be one-way benefits (from parents to infants) from the start also — they all arise together (which is why we find all three among apes as well). “Light dawns slowly over the whole.”
That makes sense.
Sort-of separate note:
Praxeology without thymology is empty;
Thymology without praxeology is blind.
You are too good. Clarifying praxeology as a priori in the theoretical sense and hermeneutic in application: I love that!
I always felt that “markets assume everyone acts rationally” was an argument against free markets. But when you think of action in the same way Wittgenstein thought of thought: acting is by definition rational just as thinking is by definition logical! And then you rule out the next objection–that markets would produce bad results if all actions are cool–by noting that, without thymology, praxeology is just a content-free framework. (I know I’m missing some important details, but the outline of this move is beautiful.)
On to chapter 7!
Is Frege’s monologism nearly identical to Chomsky’s universal grammar? Or is that just me?
I think they’re different. The universality that Chomsky claims for his grammar seems logically contingent.
Couldn’t Chomsky claim that the universal grammar in humans can only make sense of the world if the world itself operates through the same structured grammar? I don’t know if he actually makes that claim. But, if he did, would that effectively rule out even the descriptive form of polylogism?
Scratch that. Relying on universal grammar as rooted in the structure of nature is logically contingent in the same way as my proposed Dionysian exchange would ground the interactive. So logic is universal but not grounded?
Right — it’s rail-less.
I understand now why the analytic and the synthetic are inseparable (since part of having a concept–or a word even–is being able to apply it). I also understand rejecting impositionism (because it cannot foreclose different kinds of logic and so, descriptive polylogism). And I understand rejecting reflectionism (because it cannot foreclose illogical thought and so, normative polylogism).
And if impositionism is the perspective from the inner realm, and reflectionism is the perspective from the outer realm, then I understand why those cannot be separated from each other. I think I’m starting to see also why ruling-out-the-possibility-of-illogical-thought makes the third realm inseparable from the inner and hence, outer realms.
I would ask if I was on track, but without the rails, I don’t know if this is a ‘track’ anymore!