The Pythagoreans held that “justice is a square number.” There’s dispute about what this meant. But just in case I ever decide to write about it, I hereby lay claim to first formulation (at least I can’t find precedent on the internet) of the ideal title for any such discussion: “Justice As Squareness.”
(Note: by laying claim I don’t mean, of course, forbidding anyone else to use it. I just mean that if I do eventually decide to use it, and someone else has used it in the meantime, they won’t be able to claim that I swiped it from them.)
(Note deux: and for those wondering why this title is ideal – “Justice As Fairness” is the title or partial title of four (well, three and a half) different works by John Rawls, as well as a phrase used frequently throughout, and made famous by, his entire œuvre.)
What about Justice as Fair and Square?
Two really general praxeological questions pertaining to justice, utilitarianism, squareness, etc.: You say that “rule utilitarianism is praxeologically incoherent.” (And I’m cool with that.) But, is praxeology praxeologically coherent? I mean, if praxeology is the mode of observation by which we see that movements only count as action if they occur through voluntary exchange, then at what point ought we abandon the standpoint of observation and embrace engagement? (Of course I’m not speaking about you personally, teaching is most certainly an engagement.)
You say that once one gets oneself — through utilitarianism — into the position of valuing justice for its own sake, then you “wave bye-bye to utilitarianism.” Well, once you get yourself into the position of valuing voluntary exchange for its own sake, is there any reason to hold praxeology (as a mode of observation)? Wouldn’t you — by definition — just begin to exchange voluntarily? So, maybe you’re not tossing praxeology aside, but you’re at least moving beyond it. Is this not what John McDowell describes as “a different species of willing” (different from Schopenhauer’s sense of blind willing) or as “intention in action”?
One last series of questions: since it came from the Pythagoreans — with their emphasis on the oneness of all things — wouldn’t the number of justice naturally be 1? It would seem to fit since 1 (the Monad) is the product of 1X1 (the dyad) or 1 squared (the function of which could have introduced the number ‘2’ or at least a 2nd dimension/something similar to the Cartesian notion of extension).
Who said praxeology aims to get you to value anything, let alone voluntary exchange for its own sake?
In any case, since when does praxeology only counts movement as an action if it’s a voluntary exchange? I thought praxeology considered as action any purposeful employment of means to achieve ends? People engaging in coercion are still aiming to exchange circumstances they prefer less for circumstances they prefer more, after all; for that matter, so are the victims of coercion (as long as we stick with strictly praxeological analysis and treat the coercer as part of the circumstances with which the coercee is faced, so far as the coercee is concerned). Aggression, no less than the purposeful and active gathering or exploitation of any animal, machine, or other resource or capital good, is subject to all the rules and laws of economics discovered through praxeological analysis. There are serious practical differences between exploiting human beings and exploiting, say, trees. But there are serious practical differences between exploiting fish and trees, or rocks and trees, or water and trees, etc. Those differences are real, important differences; they just aren’t praxeological differences.
Who said praxeology aims to get you to value anything, let alone voluntary exchange for its own sake?
I’m not saying that is the aim of praxeology. I’m saying that is a byproduct of seeing the world through praxeological eyes.
I thought praxeology considered as action any purposeful employment of means to achieve ends?
The way I understand praxeology — which is mostly through Roderick — is that voluntary exchange is to action what logic is to thought. To me (and I admit that I may misunderstand it), Roderick’s central praxeological insight is to treat action in the way Wittgenstein treated thinking. That is: if thinking entails the employment of logic, then what may seem like thinking, in the absence of logic, is not thinking at all, but something else entirely. Similarly, (and I agree with you) action entails the employment of means to achieve consciously formulated purposes. But in what sense is doing-what-the-guy-holding-you-at-gun-point-says properly considered a consciously formulated purpose? To borrow from Rothbard: when you engage in autistic exchange with another human being, that is war, not interaction. When someone else uses you for their own purposes, then even the user is not, properly speaking, engaged in action.
Well, yeah. You may hand over your wallet because you don’t want to take the risk of dying, and hope the cops can deal with it later. Or you may be confident in your ninja gun-fu skills and attempt to disarm him, or draw and shoot before he knows what hit him, etc. Or you may hand over your wallet and then shoot him in the back and reclaim it, but then YOU have trouble with the law.. In any of these cases, you’re making a deliberate choice (perhaps hastily, and perhaps very emotionally, but you’re making a choice).
One good reason I think my meta-praxeology (Jesus Christ did I say meta-praxeology?) is better is that praxeological reasoning and the rules it discovers do in fact apply equally well to aggressive behavior as to any other behavior. Aggression has risks, costs, potential rewards, etc. and can be consciously chosen as a means to an end. Praxeology is not ethics.
“To borrow from Rothbard: when you engage in autistic exchange with another human being, that is war, not interaction.”
I am perfectly content to accept this, but I think that war consists largely of conscious and purposeful actions. The grunts on the front line may rely, on some level, on pure reflex, but even that it something they intentionally train to do, by deliberately honing their reflex responses.
So when one person exploits another coercively, I agree that it’s incorrect to treat it as a trade* (at least as an interaction between the exploiter and exploitee; someone selling a slave to someone else is in fact engaging in economic exchange; he’s being an evil bastard, but he’s also trading with someone, just not the slave). But it’s no less an action than any autistic action.
*Though arguably, excising any ethical content and using pure praxeology, this could in fact be treated as a trade, since it may well be praxeologically identical to voluntary trades with extreme disparities of bargaining power. I don’t know if that argument would be correct, but whatever the case be, again: praxeology is not ethics.
“…when one person exploits another coercively… it’s no less an action than any autistic action.”
I would say it’s no less an exchange than an autistic exchange, but I’m not convinced that autistic exchange with other humans — which is by definition involuntary exchange — counts as action. That is not a value judgment, nor is it an ethical one. Praxeological analysis examines only the logic of action. But that does not entail that every single exchange counts as an action. Many exchanges are mere re-actions. And a re-action is not an action. So when we look at war and we call it “hostile action,” we’re making the same sort of judgment we make when we call non-sense “illogical thinking.” Properly speaking, there is no such thing as “illogical thinking”; it’s an oxymoron. In the same way, there is no such thing as “hostile action”; it’s an oxymoron. It’s like trying to talk about a purple shade of green!
Again, I’m not making any ethical judgments or value judgments. I’m trying to limit myself to grammatical judgments. And I should be clear: this is my reading of Roderick and Wittgenstein’s work — not anything I’ve developed on my own.
Well, if I decide to kill me a chicken or pluck an apple, and eat it, because I’m hungry, is that not action? If so, what’s so different about forcing some poor soul to grow food for me? If anything the latter is less a re-action; it is more deliberate and calculated and proactive. Granted, not every physical movement is an action (you don’t generally have direct conscious control over your heartbeat, though you could indirectly speed it up, slow it down, or even put a stop to it if you really wanted to). I’m less sure that there are any exchanges that are unconscious; a lot of things that might not be considered conscious or “rational” actions in folk psychology are, for technical praxeological purposes, conscious rational actions (like plucking an apple and eating it).
As for reactions, if you listen to praxeological theorists, all actions are reactions in the sense that they’re responses to some situation deemed to be less satisfactory than the percieved consequences of the undertaken action. What’s the difference if the situation being reacted to, or the course of action deemed optimal, involves aggression?
Now, I agree that illogical thinking is an oxymoron (and usually when something is called “illogical” or “irrational” it’s not even illogical or irrational, and the label is being used, dishonestly, in a purely evaluative way). I just don’t see how hostile action is an oxymoron; what makes something an action is that it’s a conscious use of means to achieve some end, not that it’s mutually voluntary. I think what may be happening here is you may be mistaking praxeology for economics. Praxeology is certainly a method used in doing economics, but not the only tool used even by Austrians, and economics doesn’t exhaust the subject matter of praxeology.
“And I should be clear: this is my reading of Roderick and Wittgenstein’s work — not anything I’ve developed on my own.”
I appreciate Roderick’s work very much, but I may be less well acquainted with it than you are; I’ve never seen him claim, exactly, that praxeology is the study only of mutually voluntary exchanges (rather than consciously chosen means to ends). I know he tries to root around with praxeology to dig ethical principles out of it, and I’ve always been a little uncomfortable with that, though I do think praxeology can give us some clues and insight into ethics, in the same way that engineering can give us clues and insights into biology (e.g. how a saber tooth cat would actually make use of that rather impractical-looking munching apparatus).
What’s the difference if the situation being reacted to, or the course of action deemed optimal, involves aggression?
I want to say that the use of aggression — as opposed to the use of defense, aikido, or whatever — is necessarily driven by anger, fear, ignorance, or something like that. In other words: when emotions — even one’s own — cause a certain stream of behavior, then that stream of behavior is pre-consciously determined. And any “actions” which are pre-consciously determined are necessarily re-actions.
I understand that this has a strange side-effect: very few of us have mastery of our emotions and so, if what I say is correct, then very few of us act. Yet, that would certainly account for a world of potentially reasonable beings who seldom employ reason in their dealings.
I’ve never seen [Roderick] claim, exactly, that praxeology is the study only of mutually voluntary exchanges (rather than consciously chosen means to ends).
He doesn’t and neither am I.
If you study lightning, you may learn about electricity. If you study an apple, you may learn about gravity. If you study praxeology, you may learn about voluntary exchange.
If you learn about electricity, you might produce power. If you learn about gravity, you might engineer cool stuff. If you learn about voluntary exchange, you might act more frequently.
“I want to say that the use of aggression — as opposed to the use of defense, aikido, or whatever — is necessarily driven by anger, fear, ignorance, or something like that. In other words: when emotions — even one’s own — cause a certain stream of behavior, then that stream of behavior is pre-consciously determined. And any “actions” which are pre-consciously determined are necessarily re-actions.”
But why stop there? Why not just say that conscious action is impossible because choosing means implies you have ultimate ends (somewhere down the chain) and such ultimate ends are necessarily unchosen and so pre-conscious? But of course this would be very silly.
In any case, I don’t even think emotions are always pre-conscious (many but not all of our emotional experiences happen in the context of what we think about something, etc.), and they’re certainly not necessarily irrational. And I don’t think aggression necessarily has roots in anger, or fear, or ignorance (anger and fear are often perfectly appropriate, in any case, and ignorance isn’t really an emotion); often it could originate partially in a lack of empathy or a lack of fear for the possible consequences (i.e a lack of certain emotions).
Why not just say that conscious action is impossible because choosing means implies you have ultimate ends (somewhere down the chain) and such ultimate ends are necessarily unchosen and so pre-conscious?
First, I don’t think we have ultimate ends; I don’t think that’s coherent. We have one ultimate end. And that’s eudaimonia. Now, as rational creatures, we are most certainly able to refine our understanding of that end. The further we refine it — the more we bring it to the level of consciousness — the more choice enters into the picture.
So, there is certainly a stopping point to be found in the type of causation. Response to raw physiological needs are re-actions. Response to raw emotions are re-actions. But, the uses of cognition (note: not re-cognition) — in concert with cognitively trained emotions and cognitively tempered physiological needs — are actions.
I think you’re on to something with your second point. Response to emotion is not necessarily pre-conscious — yielding re-actions. We can certainly integrate our emotions with our cognition and so organize them in such a way that they are rational. I should upgrade the claim to say this: aggression is caused by disorganized emotions — untouched by cognition. That would allow for the proper application of anger and fear to count as rational and as action.
So, with your help, the claim is now that aggression is determined by disorganized emotions (which would cause a lack of empathy). And so, all “actions” determined by disorganized emotions and/or unrefined physiological needs are mere re-actions.
“First, I don’t think we have ultimate ends; I don’t think that’s coherent. We have one ultimate end. And that’s eudaimonia.”
Okay. But as I understand eudaimonia, it could fairly be construed as a set of distinct but interrelated and interlocking ends, hence its vagueness.
“Now, as rational creatures, we are most certainly able to refine our understanding of that end. The further we refine it — the more we bring it to the level of consciousness — the more choice enters into the picture.”
Well, intellectuality is fine, and a very important part of being human. But I think we’re needlessly collapsing rationality into intellectuality here; our intellect can be confused or mistaken in ways that have little to do with our emotions, and as Roderick himself has pointed out, being too unemotional can be irrational and vicious. Man is a rational animal, not a passive computation device.
“So, there is certainly a stopping point to be found in the type of causation. Response to raw physiological needs are re-actions. Response to raw emotions are re-actions. But, the uses of cognition (note: not re-cognition) — in concert with cognitively trained emotions and cognitively tempered physiological needs — are actions.”
I think this attempts to limit praxeology in a needless and arbitrary way. One of the things I’ve always thought was most valuable about praxeology and Austrian economics is that it can in fact offer insights about normal people (and just check out the titles of the books; Human Action, Economics for Real People, etc.) and doesn’t become completely ridiculous when stretched beyond some idealized homo oeconomicus. The Austrian theory works so well precisely because it leaves ends unspecified; real people can and do have all sorts of ends that don’t fit neatly into some academic dork’s* idea of what sort of goals people should have.
“I think you’re on to something with your second point. Response to emotion is not necessarily pre-conscious — yielding re-actions.”
Of course not. But I’d deny that “re-actions” are non-action in the praxeological sense – since by any standard that they are disqualified as action (in a praxeological sense) simply renders action impossible. Any distinction between re-action and action seems something that belongs more a field that concerns itself with ends, like ethics. Of course so-called re-actions are determined by pre-conscious factors; but all action is. It may be true (I’d grant that it is often but not always, and certainly not necessarily, true) that a “re-action” that terminates at a what we might call a lower-order point of reasoning* (e.g. an immediate response to an instance of fear or rage or hunger) will further eudaimonia less than an action that that is more “roundabout” and intellectual.
“I should upgrade the claim to say this: aggression is caused by disorganized emotions — untouched by cognition.”
I’m really very skeptical of this claim. Slave drivers are certainly more aggressive than fruit-pluckers, and yet, the slave driver’s actions are clearly more intellectual and “higher-order” than the fruit-plucker’s..
*Not directed at MBH or anyone else in this thread.
I’d deny that “re-actions” are non-action in the praxeological sense.
What then is “action” in the praxeological sense? I think action entails choice. Re-action entails the absence of choice. No?
Well, it depends on how strict you want to be in defining a reaction. If you’re talking about something like kicking out and hitting some poor dude as an involuntary reflex, then yeah, that’s not an action. If you’re talking about deliberately enslaving a bunch of people and forcing them to grow cash crops for you, or breaking into someone’s home to steal their T.V. set, then I’d say that’s an action, even if it doesn’t serve your true ultimate ends by cultivating a virtuous character or whatnot; an action is no less an action because of the actor’s imperfect knowledge of what best serves his aims. If you’re talking about bashing someone’s head in in a fit of rage, that seems like it could go either way. People in fits of rage can and do choose whether to act on that feeling, and if so, how.
If you’re talking about deliberately enslaving a bunch of people and forcing them to grow cash crops for you, or breaking into someone’s home to steal their T.V. set, then I’d say that’s an action…
I want to take praxeology as seriously as possible — experimentally to adopt what you call a meta-praxeological view. 🙂 I think you’d agree that action entails choice while re-action entails the absence of choice. But, when Larry enslaves a bunch of people, where is their choice? When Jimmy steals a T.V. set, where is the owner’s choice? Who says that praxeology is limited to one person’s point of view? Isn’t praxeology stronger if we understand it as a god’s eye view?
The god’s eye view would be that the thief is engaging in action, and the owner probably isn’t (especially if he isn’t aware what’s happening). The slaves may well engage in action by resisting capture, or trying to flee, or surrendering and collaborating, though it’s true that “being taken as a slave” is not an action itself. After enslavement they have the option of resisting, attempting escape, working quietly, sucking up to their new masters, etc.; it’s true that some of these actions are risky, and that their realistic courses are restricted, but that’s true of anyone, anywhere. If our options weren’t restricted, we wouldn’t even be making choices in the first place. We could, as Mises says, even achieve ends without the use of means at all; we would be omnipotent gods, and all of the universe just would be exactly as we prefered, simply.
Choice follows from scarcity.
After enslavement they have the option of resisting, attempting escape, working quietly, sucking up to their new masters, etc…
To me, the god’s eye view (which I think praxeology embodies) dissolves the distinction between subject and object. But, in all of the cases you list, choice is framed by a subject/object dichotomy. Even attempting escape means a person-turned-object trying to free itself from a subject. My contention is simply that these situations — in which a person is turned object — disallow for any action* by anyone.
*With the exception of raising awareness to the subject/object dichotomy.
JOR, I’m afraid you’re conflating behavior with action.
I should add: when I say that “raising awareness to the subject/object dichotomy [counts as action even in slavery situations,]” that may be misleading. By that, I simply mean, causing recognition of the dichotomy and raising awareness to something beyond it.
No, I am most certainly not conflating behavior with action, though I do think that line can be hard to draw in borderline cases (bashing someone’s head in a fit of rage, for instance). I’m just not dragging ethical content into my definition of action.
But, okay. Let’s grant your point for the sake of argument. Since it entails that slaves are incapable of action, just as such, that means they are no longer humans, and so, the slaver counts as acting just as much as he would if he were keeping and using any other non-human capital.
I’m just not dragging ethical content into my definition of action.
How does the indistinguishability between subject and object have anything to do with ethics?
…it entails that slaves are incapable of action…
Not true. I say that the recognition of and raising-awareness-to something beyond the subject/object dichotomy most certainly counts as action. So, for instance, teachers, writers, and musicians are all in better places of action than oligarchs.
Praxeology doesn’t dissolve the object/subject dichotomy, as these concepts are central to action; rather it abstracts away from psychological and circumstantial particulars. So it’s true in a sense, then, that the god’s eye view abstracts from object/subject, but to the extent that it does this, it isn’t about particular actions of individuals at all, and can’t be. It doesn’t follow that we can arbitrarily declare that some subset of psychological and circumstantial particulars (but not others!) render the deliberate use of means to achieve desired ends, in their context, to be non-action. That’s like saying geometry entitles us to declare that a particular white pillar isn’t cylindrical, because it’s white. It’s just neither here nor there.
Humans are, among other things, animals and machines. One human using another’s mechanical and animal capabilities for his own gain is engaged in action, the same as if he were using any other machine or animal. He’s being an asshole, sure, but he’s engaged in action. Likewise, the person being so used is engaged in action, so far as he chooses to acquiesce in this use.
Praxeology doesn’t dissolve the object/subject dichotomy, as these concepts are central to action…
To praxeology: action is basic. No-thing is more basic. So praxeology’s foundation is prior to the split between subject and object. We may describe action in terms of subjects and/or objects exchanging, but that description is not fundamental.
So, you’re right that it doesn’t dissolve the object/subject dichotomy in the sense that it doesn’t have to. From a praxeological perspective, that distinction doesn’t arise.
But then the praxeological perspective is limited. Some “interactions” (in everyday experience) are fundamentally and thoroughly framed through a subject/object distinction. That is, the “actor’s” means or ends do not make sense without reference to another “actor” as the means or as the end. Praxeology, as it were, cannot see or make sense of these things because — in them — action is not basic. In these situations, I’m not describing what happens as a subset of action, but something qualitatively different.
In other words, I think we impress the object/subject dichotomy on the world of action. At first, that just causes mis-perception. Eventually though — when enough people believe that to be basic — we move in such a way that takes object/subject to be basic. That movement is not action. Call it what you like, but don’t call it action.
I’m not saying it’s good or bad. I’m just saying that not everything we want to call action is actually action. Just as not everything we want to call thinking is actually thinking.
The square number thing is interesting. I see that Ernest Barker thinks it’s about equality — that justice is about equal requital, equal treatment, a state composed of equal parts. But then why not an *even* number? One composed of two equal parts, a clear symbol of fair division? I still don’t really know why a square.
If you divide a pizza into 100 equal parts, everyone is treated equally (if stingily.) If you divide a pizza into 2 equal parts, everyone is treated equally (but not many people are included.) If we say that dividing it into 10 parts is somehow fairer than either alternative, then that’s a different kind of fairness than simple equality — it’s some kind of balance of relative powers. Maybe that’s stretching an analogy too far, but I wonder if there’s any substance to it.
Is one square number just, or are all square numbers just? A square number is the product of equal, rational factors. A cubic number is also such, however; are square numbers more just than cubic numbers? Is 1, as MBH mentioned, most just, since it is square, cubic, quadratic, ad infinitum?
Identity Preservation, the one true and just IP.
“In the same way, there is no such thing as “hostile action”; it’s an oxymoron.”
This is not praxeology!
Of course not. It’s a grammatical critique of praxeology. By ‘critique’ I do not mean ‘criticism’.
Rothbard’s outline of praxeology is not perfect — as I think I’ve demonstrated elsewhere. I’m suggesting that what he calls “hostile action” (The Theory of War) ought to be a sub-category of “Crusoe Economics” (The Theory of the Isolated Individual).
Praxeology assumes nothing more than that man acts. But of course, what it is to be a man is up-for-grabs. War is something that animals do. And when we do it: we are animals, not men. Praxeology does not assume that animals act. Taking this to it’s logical conclusion: there is no such thing as hostile action because to be a man is necessarily to be civil.
“Response to raw emotions are re-actions. But, the uses of cognition (note: not re-cognition) — in concert with cognitively trained emotions and cognitively tempered physiological needs — are actions.”
Yes — so if I stave your head in out of rage, it may be a mere reaction, but if I carefully plan it for several months, it certainly is an action… but hostile nonetheless.
If you carefully plan it for several months, and go through with it, then you are either an animal or an angel — not a man — yet praxeology concerns only the action of man. If I am a man myself, and you kill me, then you are an animal. If I am an animal (an unrepentant murderer), and you kill me, then you are an angel.
What animals do and what angels do is not act but something different.
If I am an animal (an unrepentant murderer), and you kill me, then you are an angel.
You’d seem to be a vigilante to me, but whatever. I don’t believe in angels.
I tend to think of moral vigilantes as angels. By ‘angel’ I certainly don’t mean a being of different substance. Maybe just a next step in evolution.
Huh?
If you deliberately kill someone, you are still human. You remain human, regardless of whether you kill out of malice or mercy. And you are a murderer if you kill anyone out of malice: If you get to invent metaphysical distinctions to justify murder in revenge, I get to call them nonsense and worse than nonsense. Your argument is one of the rationalizations for the death penalty, but the death penalty kills innocents. Your argument is an excuse for the murder of innocents.
Also, it is a no true Scotsman.
The concept of ‘angel’ does not entail that everything one does is justified. Plus, my argument isn’t metaphysical: an animal and a human aren’t necessarily made of different substances, just as a human and an ‘angel’ aren’t necessarily made of different substances. A human could be thought of as a being with better organized substances than an animal. Just as an ‘angel’ could be thought of as a being with better organized substances than a human.
I don’t necessarily believe in angels. ‘Angel’ is just a word. But it’s at least a reference to a kind of cognition more effectively organized than most humans’ cognition. Would Darwin deny that cognition can evolve? Or would he claim that it necessarily evolves?
What’s ironic is that the “Angel” is closer to an animal than a man is. The ubermensch is just a return to a reptilian mentality, such as it is.
Are you asserting that initiatory killing is evil, but retaliatory killing is good? It sure looks like that.
If there is a cycle of revenge, between two equivalent groups, with each side killing to retaliate for the other side’s killing, the members on each side can see the other side’s killings as initiatory, and their own as retaliatory. Your claim requires that one side would be all animals, and the other side would be all angels. My claim is that both sides are wrong and both sides are the same – human.
JOR: me in state of cognitive dissonance. I agree with you but I’ve also suggested that ‘angel’ could mean a next step in our evolution. I’ll abandon the latter.
Marja: now that I’ve straightened out my contradictory ideas above I can state clearly that I don’t advocate retaliatory violence. The concept ‘angel’ is — by definition — a messenger who is somewhat of an empty vessel. In that way, the concept ‘angel’ is, as JOR points out, closer to the concept ‘animal’ than the concept ‘man’.
“Praxeology assumes nothing more than that man acts. But of course, what it is to be a man is up-for-grabs. War is something that animals do. And when we do it: we are animals, not men. Praxeology does not assume that animals act. Taking this to it’s logical conclusion: there is no such thing as hostile action because to be a man is necessarily to be civil.”
Animals eat. Therefore when we eat we are not men, but animals?
Men are always animals, regardless. Rational animals, certainly, but animals nonetheless.
I’m extremely skeptical of claims that animals don’t think or engage in action. I know Rothbard and Mises and lots of important Austrians believe this, and I think when they make claims or arguments to this effect, they are simply speaking way out of their depth. (Some) animals do seem to act – not as deliberately or roundaboutly as humans, but surely they do. (Some) animals seem to think – though not as clearly or as sharply as humans do. And of course (some) animals experience emotions, but the thing is, just as they are much less intellectual than we are, they also seem to be that much less emotional than we are.
I would agree that “animals don’t act” brings about an intuitive feeling that that judgment is wrong. But still, praxeologically speaking: “animals act” is an impossible statement.
Wait.
“If I am an animal (an unrepentant murderer), and you kill me, then you are an angel.”
…
..deliberately executing a plan to kill an animal makes one an angel? Who’d have thought hunter-gatherers were the pinnacle of rational development…
Good thing I’ve joined you in the belief that the concept ‘angel’ is closer to the concept ‘animal’ than to the concept ‘human’.
Forgive me for not being educated about philosophy, but when you say
“War is something that animals do. And when we do it: we are animals, not men” does that mean something distinct from simply making the moral judgment that war is wrong?
Members of the species Homo sapiens obviously do kill each other. And when they kill each other, they are obviously being brutal, not civil. What information do you add by saying that killing is not *human*?
You add more clear rules for when the word ‘human’ can and cannot be applied.