Guest Blog by Walter E. Block
Why do I think of Ron Paul as a libertarian and support his candidacy for president (for purposes of the present discussion I will not distinguish between these) but do not consider Randy Barnett in this way? As Roderick very, very truly says, each of these men hold views incompatible with libertarianism. Why, then, such a sharp distinction between them on my part?
To wit, Paul is mistaken in his views of abortion and immigration, while Barnett is in error on war (I leave to the side federalism.)
There are several reasons for my judgment.
1. I regard questions of war and peace, offense and defense, as far more important to libertarianism than abortion and immigration. The essence of libertarianism is the non-aggression axiom (coupled with homesteading and property rights). I see bombing innocent children and adults as a far more serious violation of liberty than aborting fetuses, or violating the rights of people to cross national borders. If this were my only reason, I regard it is sufficient to distinguish between Paul and Barnett, accepting the former as a libertarian but not the latter.
2. My second reason is that I regard abortion and immigration as far more complex issues than the question of whether a person or nation is committing an offensive act of war or a defensive one. Roderick rejects this as irrelevant. I demur. Suppose we were trying to determine who is a mathematician and who is not. Candidate A does not know that 2 + 2 = 4. Candidate B knows that, but stumbles over the Pythagorean theorem. I regard the latter as far more complex than the former. I consider B more of a mathematician than A. It seems to me that if a putative libertarian (Barnett) cannot distinguish offense from defense in such a simple case as war, while Paul certainly can, even though he stumbles on the far more complex issues of abortion and immigration, then Paul is certainly more of a libertarian, or a better one. But, the difference in complexity between these two issues is so gigantic, this difference of degree is so great that it amounts to a difference in kind, that I am entirely comfortable in evaluating Paul as a libertarian, but not Barnett.
Let me try again on this point. Here are two statements to which all Austrian economists subscribe.
a. Voluntary trade is mutually beneficial in the ex ante sense
b. The Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) is correct
I regard (a) as exceedingly simple to grasp. The Austrian credentials of anyone who does not see this, that is, agree with it, are nil. I regard (b) as very complex. Austrianism consists of belief in scores of such claims. If someone agreed to all such claims except for (b), I would consider him an Austrian. Heck, even an Austrian in good standing. But, if he rejected (a) but accepted everything else, I’d think he was pulling my leg, so weird would this be.
In other words, complexity is not at all irrelevant to the issues which separate Roderick and me. Indeed, it is very important.
3. My supposed argument from authority: I regard my own views on abortion and immigration to be the correct libertarian positions (if I did not, I would change them). However, in my assessment, Murray Rothbard, Hans Hoppe and Stephan Kinsella are three of the most import libertarian theoreticians in all of history. They disagree with me on at least one and I think both of these issues. Thus, I am a bit more modest in my stance on abortion and immigration than I would otherwise be. However, I know of NO eminent libertarian who thinks that our war in Iraq is defensive.
At first blush, you are of course correct in asserting that this is circular reasoning on my part. For, I readily admit it, if there were some other eminent libertarian (hey, give me a break, I don’t count Randroids) who did take this view, he would be dismissed, forthwith, as a libertarian in my view. Come to think of it, I think that John Hospers takes this view. Well, scratch Hospers from the ranks not only of eminent libertarian theoreticians, but from being a libertarian at all.
And yet, and yet… How else are we to determine issues of this sort? Will you concede to me that Rothbard, Hoppe and Kinsella, completely apart from the present issues under discussion, are more deserving of the title of eminent libertarian theorist than are Barnett, Hospers and the Randroids? If so, does not your position give you pause for reconsideration?
Maybe one way to reconcile our differences is as follows. I am operating from a sort of agnostic point of view: even though I have strong opinions on abortion and immigration, I am assuming, not a God’s eye point of view, but rather the position of a newcomer to libertarianism, who doesn’t know which way to go on this question since libertarian leaders diverge. You, in contrast, adopt a more knowledgeable position.
I think Block’s most compelling point is the one about mathematician A and B. Other similar examples come to mind easily: You can’t be a Catholic priest but deny that divine beings exist. You can’t be a leader of the Chinese Communist Party but affirm the great virtues and efficiency of industrial Britain. If somebody claims to be a “libertarian” and yet also affirms the Iraq war as defensive, then that person must either be 1) lying, 2) confused about one or more of the terms, or 3) simply not a libertarian at all. In Barnett’s case, 1) and 2) are hard to believe, leaving only 3).
Anon73, you’re utterly failing to distinguish between diasgreement and insanity. Denying that 2+2=4 is insanity. But reasonable people can, and frequently do, disagree about complex moral and political issues. Take abortion as a proxy here: Smith is a minimal-state libertarian, who claims that abortion is the taking of a human life. Since the role of the minimal state is do protect life, it’s legitimate to criminalize abortion. Jones, on the other hand, sees all state action as inherently suspect, and in any case isn’t convinced that abortion constitutes murder, so Jones sees laws criminalizing abortion as illegitimate statist attempts to “legislate private morality.” Which of Smith or Jones is correctly described as “simply not a libertarian at all”?
And by the way, you _can_ be a Communist Party official and affirm the virtues and efficiency of industrial Britain. Marxist theory holds each “stage” in history to be “just” inasmuch as it is fufilling its historical role. It’s not that industrial Britain wasn’t good at building up the means of production etc., it’s that once capitalism has fulfilled its historical role, it’s time for the next “stage” in history. But I digress: I recognize that you meant this to be an analogy to suggest a “disqualifying” belief, as your other example is. I agree that someone who denies the existence of divine beings can’t really be called a Catholic priest. But the analogy fails: the suggestion that Barnett is “simply not a libertarian at all” is actually like saying 2+2=5. Have you actually read “Pursuing Justice in a Free Society” or _The Structure of Liberty_?
And Walter:
“My supposed argument from authority: I regard my own views on abortion and immigration to be the correct libertarian positions (if I did not, I would change them). However, in my assessment, Murray Rothbard, Hans Hoppe and Stephan Kinsella are three of the most import libertarian theoreticians in all of history. They disagree with me on at least one and I think both of these issues. Thus, I am a bit more modest in my stance on abortion and immigration than I would otherwise be. However, I know of NO eminent libertarian who thinks that our war in Iraq is defensive.”
This is a classic “no true scotsman” fallacy. Anyone who does think this way must not be an eminint libertarian! QED. That’s circular, of course, as you yourself note – so why make this move? Why not instead say “Rothbard is a great thinker and a great libertarian theorist, but as far as I can tell, he’s mistaken about X”? Being wrong about issue X is the relevant point, after all. If you think Hospers or Barnett is wrong just argue _that_, don’t get all “you’re excommunicated now!” about it.
Just for clarity, note that Skoble is indirectly arguing, contra Block, that offensive war and abortion are both difficult, complex issues.
I agree with WB that questions like abortion and immigration have more complexity envolved when someone is trying to place then in the libertarian theory than war.
I just don’t know if supporting Ron Paul is a good strategy. I mean, sometimes you have to just pick the least horrible option (for purposes exclusively pragmatical), when there is realy a chance of one guy who would represent a somewhat less invasive government to win (and most of times the diferences between the options are infinitesimal – and yet, it’s good for you to choose).
But what’s the point in supporting a guy who realy doesn’t have a chance (That’s my impression as an outsider, I’m from Brasil) and that has his statists deviations?
I agree that Barnett’s view on the war at least is wrong, and perhaps unlibertarian. (I’m less concerned whether that makes Barnett or his thought on the whole “libertarian” or not.) His view points to an important tension in the thought of libertarians who support the war yet also oppose restrictions on gun ownership. All libertarians believe in the harm principle; people should be able to do what they want so long as they harm no one. But there is a problem presented by *instrumentalities* of harm. Bombs and guns are both instrumentalities of harm. Possession of such weapons does no one harm, but they put someone in a position to do tremendous harm. Barnett believes that the Iraq war was justified as a matter of preemptive self-defense. On such logic, why is preventing private ownership of guns not permissible as a preemptive matter of self-defense?
Brutum,
Could it be that the ownership of firearms (as an act of preventive self-defense) doesn’t lead to the violations of rights, whereas the very act of preemptive war (as an preventive act of self-defense) obviously does?
Mike S.: Sorry–I don’t think I worded my question well. Why is it OK (as it seems to be in Barnett’s view) to prevent Hussein’s possession of a bomb but not individuals’ possession of guns? (By the way, I agree with you: ownership of firearms doesn’t necessarily itself violate anyone’s rights, but preemptive war obviously does.)
Brutum Fulmen- I think the argument would go something like this: states don’t have rights, only people have rights. So individual people have a right to own firearms, but states don’t have a right to own bombs. States are justified in having national-defense weaponry, but lose their claim to that justification when they’re aggressors — e.g., post-WWII Japan. You don’t have to be a neocon to see that Iraq had a well-established pattern of aggression, w.r.t. Israel, Kuwait, Iran, and itself (esp w.r.t. Kurds), and arguably in terms of facilitating global terrorism. That’s why it’s not analogous to an individual RKBA.
Anon73- what about war and abortion is so simple, as you suggest, that no one could possibly disagree? And why are you posting anonymously?
Well, I can certainly agree that Paul is to a degree more libertarian than Barnett based on their foreign policy views, and in a hypothetical election between the two for president (wherein they are the only candidates) with the US waging war overseas, I can certainly see the argument for voting for Paul over Barnett.
But that is not the case in reality, is it? For those of us who don’t see any of the candidates as sufficiently libertarian, there is another option: Not voting at all.
Interestingly, Paul has dropped out of the race, so apparently he doesn’t see himself as quite the Last Great Hope for Peace as did many of his most vocal libertarian supporters.
Aeon: Thanks. I still don’t see it though. I agree that it would be natural for a response to my question to point to some distinction bw states’ and individuals’ rights. But as soon as one concedes that a state is “justified” (I see you avoided the word “right”, but there’s little difference) in owning weapons in self-defense, the distinction crumbles. You said that when a state becomes aggressors their claim to justified possession of weapons is vitiated. Why is not the same true of an individual who becomes aggressive with the use of his weapon?
I beg to differ – there’s a huge difference between “has a right to X” and “is justified in doing/pursuing X.” Simple example: Smith is justified in pursuing the affections of his beloved Jones, but Smith has no right to Jones’ affections. Slightly less obvious example: Bleeding-to-death-in-the-woods Smith is justified in breaking in to Jones’ cabin to obtain bandages and antibiotics, but does not have a “right to break into cabins.” So, a state might, hypothetically, be justified in doing X, but have no right to X. Another dimension of this distinction is that one’s justification for doing something might come and go, but if it’s true that one has a right to that thing, that seems like the sort of thing that would be more fixed. In any case, I still want to stick with the idea that individuals have rights and that states do not. So a state nevr has a “right to bombs.” But if a state is justified at all (this “if” requiring some argument, never a given), it might also be justified in having a defense mechanism — but it would never be justified in having an aggression mechanism. But with individuals, it’s more than a justification – it’s a right, and that’s why it’s inviolate. But then you ask whether an individual can forfeit his or her legitimate claim to a weapon by being a known aggressor. Probably, although I’m not sure what the best remedy is in a free society. In any case, I was simply trying to establish a disanalogy between these cases, on the grounds that “rights” only come up in the case of individuals.
So is Stephan Kinsella the only Eminent Libertarian Theorist who wants to license breeding?
I guess breeding licenses are one of those highly complex libertarian issues.
Of course there’s a huge difference between “justified in *pursuing* X” and a “right *to* X”; your formulation and examples misrepresent the problem at hand. (Of course Smith has no right to the *affection itself*; but I think it’s no linguistic mistake to say that he is *justified in pursuing* Jones’ affection and has a *right to pursue* the same and that there’s “little difference” between the two. I also think there’s no linguistic mistake in saying that *if Smith is bleeding to death in the woods* he has a “right” (in those circumstances) to break into Jones’ cabin–something he ordinarily has no right to do.) I am willing to concede that there might be some difference between being “justified in doing X” and having a “right to do X” (which is, of course, crucially different from having a “right to X” as you worded it), which is why I said “little” rather than “no” difference between the two. Perhaps that difference is what you suggest: we have an obligation to respect others’ exercise of “rights” but we needn’t respect (as much) what others merely are “justified” in doing. I need to think about that. But even conceding such a difference, there remains the real problem, as you rightly emphasize, of whether collectives/groups/states can have “rights”. I don’t see why they can’t, and indeed most libertarians concede that they can. Consider a corporation. Presumably “it” has a right to own property as a result of its constituents having the same right. Why doesn’t a “state” have a right to possess weaponry as a result of its constituents having the same right?
P.S. With respect to the issue of known aggressor who is an individual, I think my thoughts are the same as yours, Aeon. I’m not sure what the best remedy is. I’m also not sure in the collective context.
“Consider a corporation. Presumably “it” has a right to own property as a result of its constituents having the same right. Why doesn’t a “state” have a right to possess weaponry as a result of its constituents having the same right?”
Well, one difference is that corporations are voluntary associations and states are not. But that might not speak to the main point of your question. I need to think about that some more, BUT: that we’re having a thoughtful and sincere discussion about this demonstrates my more fundamental point, that reasonable people can disagree about certain complicated issues, and that this doesn’t mean that so-and-so “isn’t a libertarian.”
What is so complicated about immigration??? Hoppe’s argument is insane; it deserves absolutely no respect from non-bigoted libertarians like Block. Gene Callahan’s baby-analogy argument, referenced by JTK above, demonstrates just how simple the issue of immigration truly is.
And since when did Stephan Kinsella become an “eminent libertarian theorist”? The man is an even bigger fool than his bigoted idol. Who, outside of the Mises Institute, has ever heard of him (or, for that matter, Hoppe)?
Micha, I agree with you, immigration is simpler than war or abortion. I was just trying to put a stop to this silly “so-and-so isn’t really a libertarian, because he says this one thing I disagree with,” esp. in cases where so-and-so is well known primarily for libertarianism. Like Barnett: I’m not even sure he’s wrong on war issues, but assuming that arguendo, it still doesn’t mean he’s “not even a libertarian at all” — that’s just silly as regards the author of _The Structure of Liberty_, which I’d wager most of his haters haven’t even read.
I’ll admit I haven’t read Barnett’s “The Structure of Liberty”, but arguments by him justifying the Iraq War are thoroughly shoddy, like this one:
http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010344
Regardless of your assessment of _that_ argument’s merits, is it your contention that Barnett is “simply not a libertarian at all”? My claim is that such a contention would be false and silly _even if it’s true_ that the argument you cite is shoddy.
I do think a case could be made that Barnett is in no way libertarian, yes. When you support a state action that inevitably destroys innocent human beings who have committed no wrong to anyone, and/or their justly held property, you have effectively surrendered your libertarian cred. That’s WHY Barnett’s pro-war argument is for sh*t: He barely even acknowledges that perfectly innocent people are killed in the statist war he supports, people who’s only “crime” is the fate of having been born into a country targeted by the US gov’t for “regime change”. And he barely acknowledges that millions of American who if free to do so would choose NOT to finance such death and destruction are coerced to do so.
I fail to see how the issue of war could be seen as “complex,” rather than for what it is: A clear cut case of unjust aggression.
So, yeah…Though he’s free to claim the libertarian label for himself all he wants, other libertarians should be skeptical.
“I fail to see how the issue of war could be seen as “complex,” rather than for what it is: A clear cut case of unjust aggression.”
You’re confusing an empirical matter with a conceptual matter. Barnett (or you) could wrong about what this war is about factually without it meaning he (or you) has renounced liberty. Example: Let’s say I think Smith is planning to kill me, and have good reason to think this. So I kill him first. Then it turns out I was mistaken. What you can say is: I am in the wrong, and liable for my grievous error. What you can’t say is: I no longer subscribe to the non-aggression principle and don’t value life.
Aeon, I think I very well could say that “you” don’t subscribe to the non-aggression principle in that hypothetical situation of yours. If it turns out you were mistaken in your reason to think that Smith was about to kill you, then I guess it wasn’t a very “good” one at all, was it? You must have jumped to totally baseless, unsupportable conclusions based on some kind of subjective whim rather than evidence clearly indicating an actually imminent threat, which according to the non-aggression principle is the only instance in which any kind of violence can be justified. Such a person is no friend of that principle, at least not when it counts the most.
Barnett continues to support the US gov’t’s aggression against innocent people in Iraq on an ongoing basis. So it would indeed appear that he does not support the non-aggression principle, at least not in reality. Oh, he may support it in theory, and he may be able to write some really nice essays and books about it, but when it comes to real living human beings his support for that principle is rather inconsistent, at least when it comes to Iraqis.
“Interestingly, Paul has dropped out of the race”
Bob, where have you heard Paul’s concession speech?
Joe:
Well, I’ll be the first to admit that I’m confused as to the current status of his campaign. But this was the latest buzz I saw on it:
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/03/ron-paul-to-dro.html
I don’t know. Is he in it, or is he not in it? I guess I was mistaken, but the best I can tell is that he’s kind of, sort of in it. From the above linked article:
“An earlier version of this report indicated that Paul would ‘drop out’ of the race. In the video, Paul did not use the words ‘drop out,’ opting instead to say the campaign is ‘winding down,’ and he encourages supporters to still cast votes for him. But he referred to his campaign in the past tense.”
“Vote for me while my campaign is ‘winding down'”? There’s a stirring battle cry.