Lew Rockwell interviews me on today’s LRC podcast, on the subject of anarchism. (Actually the interview took place last September; there’s a bit of a podcast backlog.) I tried to avoid too much duplication with my previous LRC podcast on the same subject from two years earlier. (I vaguely remember now that we also did one on taxation two years ago but I don’t think that one ever aired.)
More complicated than what? I didn’t say how complicated it was or whether I agreed with the usage; I said that I wouldn’t understand what he was saying, if he was using it.
Do you mean as opposed to the normal usage, “The reference of ‘concept’ is to be seen as a thing.”?
In normal usage, all words are concepts, but not all concepts refer to things that exist outside of the mind.
Sense-data is not a philosophical concept; maybe it’s a philosophical term in some system to which you take exception. It’s simply the information sent from sense organs to the brain.
Normal usage: “This fireworks show is providing intense sense-data.”
The word ‘sense-data’ in that sentence is a concept?
To be a system is to be a coherent system. If ‘sense-data’ is incoherent, then “I” am not taking exception to a system. There is no system to disagree with.
If I told you how I interpret this, you won’t like it; why don’t you explain what you mean by it.
But if a scientific proposition contradicts some proposition in your metaphysics, then either the science is wrong or the metaphysics is wrong. You need to rethink one, the other or both.
E.g., I read in a book, “LIGO: Prelude to Revolution” whose author believes Einstein’s theories of relativity are wrong, that Einstein’s version of relativity is grounded in the philosophy of “logical positivism”, which he identifies as the source of his erroneous belief that all reference frames are equivalent and all the resultant absurdities that make it incompatible with quantum mechanics. OTOH, Lorentz’s relativity, based on ether theory, leads to understanding particles as standing waves in the ether, with a coherent theory that, instead of creating contradictions with Q.M., lifts the veil of mystery from its paradoxes, making Q.M. a stronger theory.
Metaphysically, there aren’t internal worlds and an external world. That distinction can’t arise, and I’ve already said why. The burden rests with you to say why consciousness should belong exclusively to “inner” realms — as if separate from other “inner” realms and the “outer” realm. And if they aren’t separate, then why exactly should we assign ownership to something that — as a whole — cannot be fragmented.
Or use a metaphysics that cannot possibly contradict empirical evidence.
By the way: I’m using metaphysics in the way David Bohm uses it — as an aesthetics. It might be safer to use ‘ontology’ for what we’re talking about. I really don’t know.
The sentence is strange, but of course. Why not? If you’re saying the concept is misused, that doesn’t prevent it from being a concept.
What would you call a “philosophy” that you disagree with, if not a “competing philosophy”? How many errors of thought may it contain before it is no longer a philosophical system?
Why not? Seriously? You know why not. Think.
An error of thought assumes a coherence that isn’t true. You’re yet to reach the coherence bar.
Since you say you’re not a solipsist, the other explanation for this statement is that all conscious entities read each other’s minds and feelings and that all knowledge of the world comes fully formed and truthfully to us with our perceptions. Unless you believe this, then you know that your limited understanding of the world comes to you through the lens of interpreted sensory evidence.
Or that fractal geometry provides a better picture of human interaction than standard geometry.
And you’ll see — from the perspective of fractal geometry — your ‘sense-data’ is useless.
So this “fractal view” is the reason you believe in “the other explanation for your statement”?
Our sense organs are useless?
I didn’t say that.
Sense Magazine is based in L.A.?
?
You don’t have an answer, do you?
That’s not an answer to the question. Your answer’s incoherent.
Apparently not one that you’re capable of grasping. You might read back over the argument a few times and try to digest some of this.
Please read this. Pretty please.
I read the link and I understand and agree with it.
As I implied, sense-data isn’t a metaphysical concept (I was wrong to say it’s not a philosophical concept, because it is, in the sense that it’s a scientific concept; science being a branch of philosophy.)
You never answered whether it was being used as a metaphysical concept in some philosophical system that annoys you; instead, you denied that there could be an incoherent philosophical system. BTW: This has the obvious implication that to describe a system as coherent is redundant, so you’d never say, “It’s a coherent philosophical system.”
It seems that you’re saying that all schools of philosophy are coherent systems. Does that include dogmatic theological philosophies? Have all philosophers, past and present, kept free of logical error? Are their systems 100% free of inconsistencies?
Anyway, what school of “non-philosophy” (if you prefer) uses “sense-data” as a metaphysical concept?
Excellent.
If science is a branch of philosophy, then either the branch plays by the trunks rules or it snaps. Many “sciences” assume they can talk about sense-data, but that directly violates the nature of the trunk. A few dead leaves can stay on a branch without being constitutive of the tree.
OK, you haven’t understood the link. Try this one. I’m not annoyed by “a philosophical system” that doesn’t do what I think “it” should do. I’m having a difficult time remaining patient with someone who assumes they’re making (meaningful) propositions when he’s not. And wow do I understand my professors frustration with me now! So dude, I can’t judge you, but I can judge that your words don’t quite conform to the sense/nonsense distinction. If you include sense-data in this “system” — even peripherally — then you’re failing to reference a system at all! To pick up the tree metaphor again: the seed unfolds over time into the branches. If the seed that you “think” is philosophy can unfold into a branch that consists of “disciplines” that examine sense-data, then you don’t see the correct seed. I’ve been there: the best advice I can give you is to let this perspective digest. Try to see why they think it’s right.
Yes, but the alternative is to allow senselessness (which is impossible but may create the delusion that “it” is possible). I would much prefer to allow redundancies — something that may or may not indicate a misunderstanding, but not a failure to reference (in deep water drilling, for instance, a redundancy can be a good thing).
Yes, but only a small percentage of institutions in the world are actual schools of philosophy or unfold from philosophy.
If the theology unfolds from philosophy then it’s more sound and valid than any “science” that allows “sense-data” where actual science only allows conceptual comprehension.
If an English professor were to look at that “sentence,” he would tell you that the grammatical structure of the adjective ‘logical’ cannot modify any noun with the grammatical structure that implies falsity. To do so is to fail to write a sentence. The English professor wouldn’t be using a loophole to ignore your question; he’d be describing why you haven’t asked a question at all.
You mean “logical errors?”
A “school of non-philosophy” is like a “house without walls.”
So “Or that” meant “No.” instead of “It’s another way to say”? In that case, in what way is my interpretation of it incorrect? what, then, does it mean? how do fractals inform you of your first statement?
‘Or’ means no matter what you said prior to ‘or’, if the second option is true, then the sentence is true.
How does Cartesian geometry inform you?
“To my mind, both thinkers rightly reject reflectionism in favour
of what I’ve been calling the “rail-less” view, but wrongly think that in doing this they
are committed to rejecting metaphysical realism in favour of postrealism. It is quite right
to say that we cannot describe extra-linguistic reality from a standpoint outside language.
But why can’t we describe extra-linguistic reality from within language? There is all the
difference in the world between saying (rightly) that we can never conceive-of-reality
apart from language, and saying (wrongly) that we can never conceive of reality-apart-from-language. ”
I think you should keep this in mind, MBH. It seems you are a postrealist.
I do accept the “rail-less” view, though I call it “the ungrounded universal.” I suppose you could call me post-realist in the sense that I find international dialogue about what is real to be fruitful, but I think that grammatical investigations — even in international talk — yield a specific picture of what reality is.
Does that not make me a post-impressionist? Where else would you place metaphysical disjunctivism?
I can’t make sense of anything you said.
I just said you’re a postrealist because I thought you were saying to Mark Uzick that metaphysics is meaningless.
I don’t say that metaphysics is meaningless. I say that philosophical problems don’t arise on the level of metaphysics. That’s not to say that philosophy is mute. Its “problems” are all resolved — through grammatical dissolution — by the time one arrives at metaphysics.
You might be confusing my take on metaphysics with my accusation that Mark’s “metaphysics” is meaningless. But I say that of his attempt because it doesn’t reach the level of metaphysics, though he identifies it as “metaphysics.” Mark is engaged in a kind of metaphysicism (Long, p. 89)– specifically, Scientism.
Meant to link Scientism here. Didn’t mean to call Mark evil. That was a link for my own blog on rejecting non-violence. Awkward.
As someone who’s been in the shoes of Mark’s propositions, I will say that we might think of the failure to submit to Logic/Grammar as a kind of evil — of the they-know-not-what-they-do sort. All the more reason to think of the AZ shooter — Jared Loughner — as ignorant rather than sick. To “think” the government controls Logic/Grammar is to ascribe magical properties to the government. Consider the autonomy of Logic/Grammar as the counterpoint (Williams, 2002).
I’m sure that I did. It’s possible that you just don’t approve of my use of “philosophy” in the more general sense of “any system of belief, values, or tenets”.
I read it and the link preceding it. The references, terminology and abbreviations made it slow going, but I think I was able to decipher most of it. If I understood it correctly, then I agree with it.
1. You’re wrongly assuming that the science is built on your philosophy.
2. If the application of your philosophy leads to the conclusion that you have no sense organs or that you do, but they’re non-functional, then it’s pretty certain that your philosophy is flawed and should be rethought.
Sense-data isn’t integral to my system, only perception is. The steps from sense stimulation to the processing of the resultant information in the brain is not a metaphysical system, but a a posteriori confirmation of it.
You have made an error in grammatical logic. If you start with a false premise, wouldn’t you, applying logical analysis to it, come to an erroneous conclusion, i.e., a logical error? Isn’t that how a reductio ad absurdum works, e.g., when your metaphysics leads to the logical error that your sense organs are non-functional?
But I also made an error in logic by using “logical error” instead of “errors in logic” or “illogical propositions”.
Behavior is something that people “don’t approve of.” Logic is something that no one even has an opportunity to violate. To say that I’m not approving of your use of philosophy is like saying that I don’t approve of you saying “mathematically: 2 + 2 =” with “7.” I can’t approve or disapprove of that “statement.” If you fail to reference, then you’re “acting” from delusion. That’s a de-worlded “perspective” (Dreyfus, 2008). Technically, you’ve said nothing.
(a) Nowhere do I say this philosophy is “mine.” (b) I’m not saying science is built “on” philosophy. I’m saying that, for a science to be sound and valid, it cannot contradict philosophy.
Philosophy says nothing about sense-organs. Their truth-value is only in biology, physics, etc.
Confirmation of what!?!? If you insist on looking to neurology to “inform your metaphysics” (whatever that means), then why does the brain treat qualia as if it’s “out there” in the world like tables and chairs? See Mirror Neurons.
If you “apply logical analysis” to a false premise, then you see that the premise is false and stop. Unless you care to find out why you tried to start with something false in the first place. But either way, you don’t go on with a false premise if you “apply logical analysis” to it. You may go on against it.
Mark, it’s the same thing. Logic has errors like desks have toilets.
You have strange definitions for some common words. There’s nothing in the definition that limits approval or lack of it to behavior.
“You don’t agree with my use of ‘philosophy’.” means the same as, “You don’t approve of my use of ‘philosophy’.”
The point was that there’s more than one.
It can, if it’s built on a different philosophy.
Since science is a branch of philosophy, your statement is illogical.
Metaphysical beliefs.
Not “inform” but “confirm”.
Assuming qualia have an effect on our brains, which I tend to believe, and it’s not just brain activities that (generate?) these qualia that do, then since these qualia and associated brain activities are its perception of what’s “out there”, that is what the brain responds to.
But you’re saying that the brain is not able to distinguish between perception and the perceived, wrongly implying a lack of self awareness.
Eventually, you will discover that it’s false, e.g., when you discover that the brain constructs a picture and then goes through various steps of interpretation to guess at, define, and categorize what it is and then you realize that the impression that we perceive concepts directly is an illusion.
Logical analysis and self reflection could, in this case, do away with this misconception, even without the science, but in the case of those who stubbornly cling to their illusions, it’s possible that science may encourage them to rethink their beliefs.
You’re implying that an illogical statement is always intentional, i.e., it’s never an error in logic. That means that your illogical statement about “logical errors” being grammatically meaningless was intentional, not an error in logic.
I gave one instance of ‘behavior’ used properly and you’re pretending I said that’s the only way it can be used properly.
The rest of your “questions”/”responses” follow this illogic.
I don’t get your meaning.
Then what did you mean?
It doesn’t inform my understanding of metaphysics nor should fractals inform yours, unless you feel they have a posteriori confirmatory value.
“Inform my understanding of metaphysics” doesn’t make sense. Metaphysics is not something understood, but the way you live. Fractal geometry doesn’t “inform my understanding of metaphysics.” It helps me see — to borrow from Roderick — the difference between metaphysics and metaphysicism (Long, 2009). From within Fractal Geometry I can clearly sense self-similarity; what you might call “home” in philosophy (McDowell, 1994) — how the world isn’t bat shit crazy (Jolley, 2011). The “curve” of self-similarity should give a sense in which “experience” is linear.
You equated:
with:
And now you say it doesn’t make sense “to inform your metaphysics”.
This brings us back to your question, “How does Cartesian geometry inform you?” and my answer, “It doesn’t inform my understanding of metaphysics nor should fractals inform yours, unless you feel they have a posteriori confirmatory value.”
Hey Mark, are you an Air Force-created avatar? ‘Cause I’m definitely thinking you’re not real.
No. You replied to my comment by insinuating that my use of the word “approval” made my question meaningless. Bringing up one instance of the word’s correct use has no relevance to anything I asked or that was being discussed. Claiming you did this is false and silly; it’s clearly obfuscation to evade admitting to your mistake.
No one was forcing you to reply. If you couldn’t reply or didn’t feel like it, it was unnecessary to make things up.
If a child playing chess tries to move a bishop horizontally and you take the piece and move it diagonally to the left and say “This is how the bishop moves,” then what would you say to the child if he turned and said, “No! The bishop also moves diagonally to right! Don’t even pretend your move to left leaves open that opportunity!”
I’m curious: what would you say to the child?
The same sort of thing that I said to you, since the child’s evasion is analogous to yours.
So you’re down to “I know you are but what am I.” Nice.
I was just stating a fact. If you think I’m wrong, then explain how your statement:
can be a response to:
and be anything but an awkward way of saying that approval can only refer to behavior.
It should be even more embarrassing for you if your claim that you were referring to the word “behavior” and that it was something of which, in some instances, people might not approve; a multi pronged non-sequitur.
When you’re wrong, just correct yourself; don’t try to deny it by obfuscation; you’ll only make yourself look worse.
Mark, try to relax and absorb the meaning of what’s being said. Maybe re-read this a couple times before you respond. Look at what I’m symbolizing; not which signs I’m using. You’ve admitted that the sideways-on “view” is incoherent. What’s incoherent is senseless. What’s senseless is not available for cognition. What’s not available for cognition is inarticulable. What’s inarticulable has no being whatsoever. If you want to say that it has some being, then you’ll have put the sideways-on glasses on. And what do you see out of the glasses that you place on the side of your face?
Think about it…
You may want to say nothing. But wait. How can you see nothing where you can’t possibly see at all? Put aside what you might see, the question is what you do see. If you answer “nothing,” then you haven’t answered the question correctly. The only way to answer the question correctly is to point out that the question cannot possibly reference anything! And what cannot possibly reference anything — true or false — has no sense. And what has no sense is not available for cognition. What’s not available for cognition is inarticulable. And what’s inarticulable has no being whatsoever.
So look at these random marks on the screen here that vaguely resemble a sentence: And what do you see out of the glasses that you place on the side of your face?
But we already know that these marks are mere impostors! It’s like a trick! Sentences symbolize something; this thing here can’t symbolize anything. It’s not a sentence at all. You’ve heard “all sizzle; no steak?” Here we’ve got all sign; no symbol. So what if someone asks you how you feel about this sentence? What’s the logically precise response?—You redirect their question: you tell them, “your use of ‘this sentence’ fails to reference what want it to reference.” You might tell them: “what you want to reference is a bunch of data from a server representing words that do not do what’s required of them to form a sentence.” He may ask you, “well, what how do you feel about these words?”
And here you may want to say that you disapprove of them. But are you — personally — doing the disapproving or someone/something else?
If a child tries to play chess by moving a bishop horizontally, would you tell him that you don’t approve of that move — imagine the child’s confusion! the big peoples’ feelings determine the rules! — or would you appeal to the rules themselves?
What about when someone asks you about the words that don’t form a sentence? Would you tell him how you feel about the words? Or would you tell him something about the grammatical laws that disallow those words, in that order, and in that context, from counting as a sentence?
What about when someone asks you how you feel about this sentence: “It comes from a philosophical system that starts by affirming the sideways-on view.” Would you tell them that you disapprove of that sentence? Or would you say that ‘affirming the sideways-on view’ is a senseless jumble of words? And if a philosophical system is necessarily built on sensible concepts, then wouldn’t you have to break it to them that what they want to describe is not a philosophical system at all?
That wasn’t a reply to my comment; it’s a different subject altogether, but, since it’s obvious you want to ignore it and your reply is getting back to the discussion before you sidetracked it, I’ll just go ahead and address what you said:
So one isn’t permitted to say that he disapproves of philosophical systems that are built on some incoherent premise or contains any incoherency?
To say that you cannot agree or disagree with an illogical statement (I’m not yet convinced of this.) is one thing, but to say that you cannot agree or disagree about whether one should believe in illogical propositions and the philosophies built upon them is a different thing.(I disagree with both things.)
You have strange ideas about the meanings of words. To say that I disapprove of the words, because they convey no meaning, doesn’t convey how I feel about the words. That’s why it’s necessary to use adjectives, such as “sadly” to covey any feelings that may accompany my disapproval.
Again: Approval is not about feelings.
I don’t disapprove of the sentence. I would say that I disapprove of philosophical systems that are premised on the sideways-on view, because the sideways-on view is senseless.
If you first define “philosophy” as rational, then you have a point, but the vernacular definition is, “any system of belief, values, or tenets.”
I would say that a logical philosophical system is necessarily built on sensible concepts and that an irrational philosophical system is not oriented toward reality and so is oriented toward either error or deception.
How generous of you. I promise, I will never again provide a background from which to place my reply in perspective. I don’t want you to have to think on two levels ever again. It’s obviously causing you distress. Sincerest apologies.
You asked two entirely different questions. (1) “A philosophical system” built on an incoherent — specifically, inarticulable — premise may be a collection of signs, a collection of words, and you may even want to pretend that it has something to say you can understand, though you choose to negate it. But it is not a philosophical system anymore than “a glass of water” without the glass and without the water is a glass of water. If I point to an object-less desk top and said, “There is a glass of water,” then according to your “logic,” I’m most certainly referencing a glass of water. It just happens to be the species of glass of water that isn’t a glass and isn’t water. But if you classify that as a kind of glass of water, then everything is a species of everything! And if that’s the case then nothing could ever be distinguishable from anything else. If that’s the case, then nothing could ever make sense. If that’s the case, then you’re just as justified in adopting the sideways-on view as you are the head-on view. If that’s the case, then what the funk are you doing saying the sideways-on view is incoherent? You’re undercutting yourself! You’re stuck in self-defeating tail-chase! Why should anyone consider that cluster-funk of nonsense “a philosophical system?” That’s like calling your lawn “a talk show,” and saying that it’s valid because you admit it’s not a very good talk show.
You can say the words: ‘I’. ‘Disapprove’. ‘Of’. ‘That’. ‘Philosophical’. ‘System’. You can also dump chess pieces in the garbage. But you can’t point to the garbage can and say to the other player, “That was e2 to e4; your turn.” At least not in chess, it would be quite funny in a joke. But it’s funny precisely because it’s nothing in chess. If the truth-criteria is humor — or maybe even annoyance — then it’s sensible under that standard. But if you’re wanting to place “a philosophical system” under the standard of humor or annoyance, then fine. However, don’t get your panties in a wad when people serious about philosophy tell you the “system” is inarticulable under the standard of philosophy. No one’s saying what you’re doing is bad; no one’s saying it’s good. You’re not doing anything.
(2) Can a philosophical system with incoherent aspects qualify as a philosophical system?—It depends on whether the aspects are incidental and can be deleted from the system or whether the aspects are essential and cannot be deleted without fundamentally changing the “system.” If you’re serious about the head-on view, then you’ll see that even scientists must experiment from the head-on view in order to collect sound and valid data. If, on the other hand, you want to say that the head-on view is true for philosophy, but scientists should be allowed to use the sideways-on view — sense-data, etc. — then you’re either disingenuous about the head-on view, or you still don’t understand it. In those instances, what you’re calling “the head-on view” isn’t the head-on view. So if you “say” that, “The head-on view allows scientists to operate through sense-data,” then you might as well throw the chess pieces in the garbage and tell the other player “That was e2 to e4; your turn. I’m serious.”
I refuse to go into the garbage and set the game up again. It was funny until you said you weren’t joking. Put your mind in neutral, and let’s try to rethink which direction we want to go in.
Coming from you, I take that as a complement.
In my understanding of — what Stanley Cavell calls — de-psychologized psychology, the usual tripartite distinction — the affective system, the behavioral system, and the cognitive system — is misleading, at least insofar as we’re supposed to think of them as, in any way, autonomous from one another. Really, logical grammar (non-physical non-local omnipresent congruity, if you need something juicy-sounding) is the autonomous entity, and each of the ABC’s are subservient to it. When you talk about approving or disapproving of someone’s “use” of logical grammar, you “act” as if you are the standard bearer of logical grammar. I’m calling this a mere feeling, but I’m doing so to suggest the non-cognitive, purely temperamental aspect to what is ultimately gibberish. Logical grammar is the way of the world. When you pretend it’s something that you can either approve of or disapprove of, then you’re playing this weird Mary Poppins/Hitler “role”.
When the object of approval/disapproval is logical grammar, then it’s about temperament. Nothing rational is going on. Not even close.
And I say that you’re playing that Mary Poppins/Hitler “role” by pretending that you can disapprove of “illogical” grammar or “illogical” thought, and approve logical grammar. That’s like approving that there is a sky. How does that make any sense?
Dude. An irrational “philosophy” is not a philosophy. How could a word that means “love of wisdom,” “reference” something irrational? If you first define wisdom as irrational, then at least you’d be consistent. Is this Rush Limbaugh?
Please stop throwing the chess pieces in the garbage. I would be much appreciative.
I think you’ll object that, “An irrational philosophical system is not oriented toward reality and so it is oriented toward meaninglessness.” and, in one sense, you’d be right, but what I mean is that the purpose of promulgating irrational philosophies is to rationalize false preconceptions or to deceive followers into accepting false beliefs for one’s dishonest ends.
And yes; I still say that a failed attempt at logic, or the illogical, is a kind of error. Even if the illogical is intentional, then it’s just a kind of intentional error.
No. You still don’t get it. I say “It is oriented toward meaninglessness,” assumes an “it” in the first place. But if “it” is meaningless, then “it” cannot be spoken. And if “it” cannot be spoken, then there’s nothing to be oriented toward meaninglessness!
You still haven’t formed a sentence. You assume some senseless means to a senseless end. The means has already been shown to be senseless — about 500 times. A dishonest “end” makes as much sense as a wall-less “house.” You’re treating ‘end’ as if it were the point of injunctive norms, as if carrots and sticks could actually bring about an end, in and of themselves. But to have an end is to have something beyond reward and punishment. When you talk about dishonest “ends,” you’re talking about some pleasurable result. But that’s not an end. An end can only derive from disjunctive norms. These have nothing to do with carrots and sticks. A disjunctive norm is the power of logical grammar to prompt linear movement along its line of thinking. But for God’s sake, quit taking that as some kind of cult-like process. It’s perfectly applicable within every religion in the world. It’s like Occam’s Razor: countless “religious” folks are scared of it, yet it strengthens their doctrines.
Please stop throwing words in the garbage. I would be much appreciative.
I don’t mind if you want to evade your illogical statement/non-sequitur, however you prefer to interpret what you said, but don’t pretend that there was some second level from which you addressed it, because the only rational thing you could have said was “oops”.
You’re not paying attention; I’ve already agreed that this is correct, provided that you are using a specific definition of philosophy, not it’s most general meaning, “Any system of belief, values, or tenets.”
I understand that you dislike it when people refer to illogical beliefs as philosophies; it cheapens the word, but in our language, words can have multiple meanings.
I agree, but notice how you switched to the general definition of “philosophy” in order to make this statement. In the second case, you’re referring to a philosophy with incoherent aspects that “are essential and cannot be deleted without fundamentally changing the ‘system.'”
I can only imagine how you would just go on and on about this if I had said it.
Is it that:
1. you don’t agree with the advisability of speaking coherently and you don’t agree with inadvisability of speaking incoherently?
2. or are you saying that I cannot approve of something, unless I am the standard bearer of something?
How’s that?
“There is a sky.” is not something that people do; there’s nothing to agree with. Thoughts and actions are things with which we can agree/disagree.
It’s amazing, but true.
Here’s another one:
How can “government” reference the state, something that in its essence, is anarchic?
Our language can be a paradox. Just keep it in mind that words can have multiple meanings, some of which aren’t etiologically sound.
You’re leveling insults for the sake of insults. This has no place in discourse.
You treat logical grammar as a sometimes important, sometimes discardable means to some other end. The whole point is that logical grammar is an end in itself, an autonomous self-sustaining end. It is the essence of clarity. You act like it’s incidental, like it will manifest no matter what you say — just to a lesser degree. That is not the case. When you “say” that “illogical thought is meaningful, just not as meaningful as logical thought,” it’s not that you’re saying a half-truth. It’s that you’ve failed to say something with a truth-value at all. If you’re willing to stand behind that “proposition” and say that it functions like a micro black hole, then and only then could the “proposition” hold a truth-value. But it wouldn’t be as a proposition; it would be as an endless pit. You keep pumping out these pits as if they’re propositions. Your “method” is a sickness. Words can have multiple meanings, but to be meaningful, a word must be used in a way that’s sensible. “Have truck broccoli turn house desk six,” is not a sentence. You’re committed to saying, “Oh yes it is, it just doesn’t mean as much as most sentences mean.” You treat meaning quantitatively, as if it’s simply a matter of degree. No! Meaning is a qualitative business! There’s no partial credit! A proposition — given a specific context — either has a meaning or it doesn’t!
Dude. You’ve got a serious — but hopefully temporary — case of meaning-blindness. I put ‘system’ in scare quotes to signify the switch. I then stand behind this use of “a philosophical system” and show that it references nothing, that it’s like a formal concept trying to enter a proper concept in a non-variable form. Remember why that’s impossible.
(1) Do you think offering advice is the same as offering approval? Do you also think offering direction is the same as offering a thumbs up? (2) I’m saying that you cannot approve/disapprove of logical grammar any more than you can approve/disapprove driving on the right side of the road in America as long as that’s the convention. It goes without saying. You may tell a student driver that they do a good job of not veering into the other lane, but you don’t tell them that you approve of their “decision” to stay in the right lane.
To “do” so is to insert a non-variable formal concept into a proper concept. It’s like trying to “talk” about the function — not of a proposition — but of functioning itself. It’s like trying to stand behind the you that’s standing behind the you that’s standing behind your propositions. You can only step behind yourself once. You can be the you that stands behind the you that stands behind the proposition, but you can’t step back any further — any further means infinite regress.
Are you suggesting that approval is identical to agreeing?
Dude. The word ‘philosophy’ can only “reference” something irrational if you’re standing behind a “proposition” and describing why it’s not a proposition. That’s an activity, but it’s intransitive: there is no object. The whole point is to describe why the object is not there. That may be a tad more important to keep in mind then that language can be tricky. Of course it can be tricky, but it can also be nothing.
Yet they give “it” names and build complex pseudoscience, religions, ideologies and philosophies around “it”. “It” may well be gibberish, but ignore “it” at your peril.
I’m speaking of lies about the intended consequences of actions by which people are manipulated into acting against their own interests.
I’m not saying ignore “it.” I’m saying quit acting like “it” is an “object.”
But why do you call that an “end?” How are lies “ends?”
No…I was referencing the fact that you kept ignoring my point: that words can have different meanings, and kept on lecturing me as if I was using the particular meanings to which you want to confine me.
If people’s actions are a meaningful subject, then the thoughts that motivate their actions are a meaningful subject, even if the thoughts have no truth value, because, in their minds, they’ve convinced themselves that they do. Think of it as the meaning that you may find in a “psychological autopsy”.
I’m not as thin skinned as you, so I’ll just say,”My method is English.” I’d probably find it preferable if our language permitted only one meaning per word, but I’m not in charge of our language and neither are you.
Referring to some dogma as a philosophy does have meaning, if by “philosophy” you mean “Any system of belief, values, or tenets.”
How are you going to convince a librarian that, on the grounds of it’s irrationality, “Das Kapital” should not be filed under “political philosophy”?
You didn’t put “philosophy” in scare quotes, even though it was in reference to an illogical system. “System”, actually, didn’t require scare quotes, since it’s an assemblage of parts forming a whole, whose parts are not necessarily rational.
That aside, are you saying that all I have to do to avoid being lectured is to use scare quotes? I could agree to the virtue of using them to emphasize my disdain for some “philosophy”(Yeah; that feels good.), but I don’t believe that they’re technically required.
I’m unclear about the meaning of the terms “formal concept” and “proper concept”.
No…not the way you word it; I think that if I say that something is advisable, then it’s something that meets with my approval.
It goes without saying that I disapprove of reckless driving, especially driving against traffic.
Why can’t I say that I approve of a driver’s adherence to traffic safety rules?
No…”approve” means “to agree to” and “approval” means “to be in agreement with”.
If you’re confused because “approve” in another definition can connote a favorable emotion along with agreement, then also consider that the word “agree” can connote emotion as well; so the relationship between the two words still survives the change in meaning, e.g., “I meet this surprising news approvingly.” or ” This news comes as an agreeable surprise.
To reference, “Any system of belief, values, or tenets.” could be to reference either the rational or the irrational, but scare quotes will serve your purpose if you believe that referring to a fundamentally flawed philosophy will cause confusion.
Just remember to tell that librarian to file that book under “‘philosophy'”, instead of “philosophy”.
Where have I said that words don’t have different meanings?
The manifestation of a delusion is not an action. The second you allow contradictions/illogic to count as thoughts, you also throw free will out the window. To have free will, you have to deal with probabilities, a propositions potential to be true or false. By killing truth value you also kill probability — nothing is either true or false, it’s bat shit all the way down (and everywhere else). No free will; no action. No action; all is reaction. An action entails intention. No intention with 100% chaos or 100% determinism. No intention; no action. What’s the opposite of beautiful?
My claims don’t depend on one meaning per word! It only depends on not combining signs with contradictory truth-grounds. If ‘coherent’ symbolized ‘illogical’, then “coherent thought” is also inarticulable.
If the criteria for dogma is introducing an operation without justification, then the philosophy I’m describing is non-dogmatic because every combination of propositions necessarily manifests the operations that determine their truth-functions. If you want to say that the symbol ‘illogical’ and the symbol ‘thought’ combined — in the context of thinking the unthinkable — then you’re “system” is dogmatic because, without prefacing your “operations,” you arbitrarily throw out the truth-grounds and then “operate” on combinations of words as if there’s still some truth-function to salvage any meaning.
Marx was a materialist. Materialism has no truth-grounds. What has no truth-grounds cannot be operated upon. Philosophy is this act of operation. Any book that does not operate upon propositions and their manifest truth-grounds has no philosophy in it. Das Kapital frames its content without truth-grounds. Das Kapital is gibberish. So is all of Ayn Rand’s explicitly “philosophical” work.
Nonsense. “X is an assemblage of parts forming a whole” better have truth-grounds or else it’s blah blah blah just like everything else you’ve been “saying.”
Scare quotes is a way of saying, “this sign is being used in a way that has no truth-grounds.” Nothing to do with taste, as you seem incapable of grasping.
Proper concepts fall under formal concepts. So the proper concept ‘books’ fall under the formal concept ‘objects’. Formal concepts cannot insert themselves unaltered into a proper concept, say, the content of a proposition. “The books are heavy objects,” has no sense because the formal concept is posing as a proper concept. Their truth-grounds are qualitatively different. But if the formal concept expresses itself as a variable in the proper concept, then the truth-grounds are consistent.
That’s dis-analogous. To approve of logical grammar would be analogous to approving that a driver didn’t try to re-write the convention to “Everyone drives both ways on the right side.”
You cannot approve of the use of propositions with truth-grounds as opposed to “propositions” without truth-grounds. No more than you “operate” on the inoperable.
If I were to make a suggestion to librarians, I would tell them to not use ‘philosophy’ for non-philosophy. Not to give it a face lift.
Do I?
“Dishonest ends” are the actual ends one hopes to bring about by using lies about how to achieve purported ends in order to manipulate people’s actions.
The lies are not ends, but the purported end is a lie, i.e., the lies are about the purported end.
That’s funny! It would make a great bumper sticker.
If you’re unclear on the distinction between formal concept and proper concept, then yes, most likely.
Well, you’re not saying anything. I picture it in terms of organization development. Think of Kurt Lewin’s field theory, where people are points, movements are vectors, and ends are valences. In the corporatist state system, some points represent stockholders, and their vectors represent instructing employers on where to place valences. Employer movement is represented by vectors an the carefully placed valences to entice employee vectors to move toward the valences. That’s fancy talk for carrots and sticks. What I’m saying is that, where injunctive norms rule, there are no such thing as ends on this field. But where disjunctive norms rule, there is a field with ends. On this field, the valences are ubiquitous since all means are constitutive of ends. No need for vectors on this field. Realistically, the only vectors relative to this field would be from the disjunctive field down to the injunctive field’s points to help them see the field without vectors.
Why do you think that ignoring a point is the same as denying that its true?
A reaction is an action.
Explain the difference between “will” and “free will”.
Your point is unclear to me. I understand that it’s redundant to add “objects” to the sentence, since it’s understood that book are objects, but let’s say I was sorting various objects, including books, according to their weight being above or below some measure, as “light objects”or “heavy objects” and the books all fell into the “heavy object” classification. Are you saying that, even in this context, I can’t say that the books are heavy objects?
Are you saying that failure to adhere to traffic safety rules isn’t the same as rewriting them, but failure to adhere to the rules of logical grammar is the same as rewriting them?
So you cannot approve of rationality?
What realistic category would you suggest? or would you really have libraries start a new subject section called “non-philosophy”?
Would you change the title of “History of Philosophy” books and courses to “History of Mostly Non-philosophy and Some Philosophy”?
Ignoring? Tell me then what you think I mean here: “My claims don’t depend on one meaning per word! It only depends on not combining signs with contradictory truth-grounds. If ‘coherent’ symbolized ‘illogical’, then “coherent thought” is also inarticulable.” Take your time…
Not if ‘reaction’ is meant in the strictly biochemical sense and ‘action’ is meant in the strictly economic sense.
Will is expressed in the strictly biochemical sense (Schopenhaeur, 1818). Free will manifests a state of mind beyond the biochemical realm, or at the very least, the hylomorphic sense of that realm as a whole (Bohm, 1992).
In an explicitly sorting context, I don’t see anything wrong with it.
Failure to adhere to traffic safety rules is breaking the rules. Failure to adhere to logical grammar is just to be in the realm of strictly biochemical reactions. We can make sense of that realm as a whole — through language — but to be in that realm is to loose track of it as a whole. Once you’ve lost it as a whole, then you’re subservient to it. At that point nothing is comprehensible. So failure to adhere to logical grammar disallows doing anything about its rules.
If you manifest disapproval of rationality then you’re in part of the strictly biochemical realm. From there, you cannot do anything — especially approve or disapprove of something.
Good question. Maybe “Philosophy Attempts.”
I would distinguish between “History of Philosophy” and “History of Philosophy Attempts.” Even pre-Socratic philosophers did some philosophy.
I.e., you can’t think of any examples of what you claim.
If I understand you correctly, then I’m saying that a “dishonest end” might be to bring about a society where injunctive norms rule.
I’ll say again: where philosophy attempts aren’t explicitly contextualized as such, then you’re implying that philosophy attempts count as philosophy.
In that explicit context, ‘dishonest end’ has a reference. I see nothing wrong with that.
It’s true that, after I said you where ignoring my point, you did address it by saying, in effect, that established meanings for words, if they’re incoherent, should be either eliminated from one’s vocabulary or put in scare quotes.
I think it’s a good idea, but that when doing so, you should be explicit, from the beginning, as to why you believe it’s necessary to use language in this unconventional, but rational, way, so as to avoid confusion. You may think it’s obvious, but I can tell you from experience, that any departure from customary language will only create great hostility; a lot of simple explanation accompanying this departure is the only chance that it will give you the opportunity to do anything more than just talk to yourself.
In any sense, a reaction is a kind of action.
In the translators introduction: “a will determined by motives cannot be free.”
I take this to mean that “free will” as “conscious will” doesn’t contradict determinism. There is no difference between “will” and “free will” if you rule out referring to “blind reaction” as “will”.
In the way that most people use it, “free will” is as senseless as “God”.
In what other context might someone say that without being redundant? i.e., is redundancy the only reason for having this rule, or are there other reasons for not using a formal concept in place of a proper concept? are there other sentences, without the redundancy, that break this rule, which you can show to be senseless?
Nonsense…in response to your disapproval of illogical statements, accompanied by reasoned explanation of how one has failed to adhere to logic, one may see his error or oversight and correct his language, just as in response to your reasoned explanation for your disapproval of one’s failure to adhere to traffic safety rules, accompanied by explanation of how one has broken them, one may correct his driving habits.
That’s unfortunate, but fair.
How would you perceive a purely biochemical reaction 100% independent of your concepts? (Does that question even make sense? If not, then purely biochemical “reactions” can’t be articulated at all.)
Not exactly. A will not determined by motives is free in the sense that it manifests beyond the field of injunctive norms, beyond reward and punishment. Plato calls it the Good, Kant calls it Good Will, Schopenhauer calls it the aesthetic life, Wittgenstein calls it the ethical, what’s inside logic. In Aristotelian terms it is 100% Agent Intellect. Those things are by no means determined, except in that they’re deterministically above the biochemical realm.
The way people conventionally use “free will” is as senseless as the way people conventionally use “God.” I think both — when used properly — reference something meaningful. Though you’re right to suggest they’re both used, usually, like leftover cinder blocks that construct nothing.
Yeah, I mean, “8 is a number,” is senseless. It leads us to believe that the formal concept ‘number’ just is (=) 8 or 2 or 5, etc. Worse than redundant, that “proposition” obscures the meaning of the formal concept ‘number’. ‘Number’ is a symbol, an arrow, that points toward the successive operations applied to a variable. How would you know that if you were taught that “These are numbers: 1, 2, 3… you know, those things.” It would be like saying: “A sign and a symbol are no different,” or more fittingly to this particular instance: “An operation and a symbol are no different.”
The next question is: are those propositions wrong or do they even count as propositions? I’m inclined to follow Kelly Jolley’s lead (Jolley, 2010) and make a twofold response: on the one hand, ‘operation’ qua formal concept, is a verb (insofar as it can enter a proposition at all). Wittgenstein might say that it makes itself manifest. That is what the symbol ‘operation’ points toward: a doing something with or to something else. Insofar as one wants to place this symbol in a sentence as a noun, rather than a variable, then this “motive” is delusion. On the other hand, if you say “The verb ‘operation’ is no different than the pointer ‘symbol’,” then it’s not senseless, it’s just wrong.
I see your point. “Failure to adhere to logical grammar” isn’t sayable in the first place. I slipped there. That can only make itself manifest. And you’re saying, if I understand you correctly, that such manifestation provides a window to — instead of ‘explain’, I think you mean to say — demonstrate what cannot even rise to the level of questioning.
“If people never did silly things nothing intelligent would ever get done.” LW
Let me bring back up the context so this addendum fits:
Addendum: It may be fruitful to think of a place-holder for that which otherwise is a variable, but, for the sake of demonstrating a mistake, is represented as a seeming noun. I mean, “The verb ‘operation’,” will only make sense to folks who already distinguish operations from proper concepts. And this goes back to my suggested creation of a new language — say, something in between standard English and symbolic logic. I don’t think it’s specifically what he had in mind, but Einstein’s protege suggests creating a rheomode (Bohm, 1998), under which my proposed 6-part language may fall. We wouldn’t need Wittgenstein’s 7th part since it would come with built-in distinctions between modes. It could distinguish formal concepts from proper concepts, operations from truth-grounds, and signs from symbols, and be more accessible than symbolic logic. It would transcend standard English and symbolic logic, and if taught in high schools, imagine the confusion and misunderstanding we could prevent, and how efficiently too! Words and phrases that signify simples, names, assignments prior to language-games, etc. can be explicitly shown as such. Words and phrases that symbolize formal concepts, categories under which the simples fall, etc. can be explicitly shown as such. Words and phrases that help make the propositions cohere can be explicitly shown as such. Words and phrases that represent truth-grounds and internal relations can be explicitly shown as such. Words and phrases that manifest themselves, automatically operate on variables, etc. can be explicitly shown as such. And of course, words and phrases that reference this platform itself can be explicitly shown as such. For instance, see here.
I’m not sure why you’re emphasizing the distinction between different types of actions by people: “blind reaction”, i.e., instinctive reactions versus actions made with conscious deliberation, since, ultimately, a learned instinct is created though the instruction of the unconscious mind through a consciously chosen belief at an earlier time.
In any case, the result is actions, regardless of how you wish to classify them, and whether they are ultimately based on sound logic or faulty logic, those actions and their causes are relevant to everyone in any way connected to the society where the actions occur.
I thought we were discussing Schopenhauer’s “free will”: ” Schopenhauer uses the word to indicate will with the power of choice, will determined by motives, conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.”
He does talk about something other than “free will”: “a will that is absolutely free in the metaphysical sense before it has assumed the phenomenal form. He emphatically denies the existence of such a freedom in the world of phenomena.”
Doesn’t this imply that consciousness is not a phenomena, having no real existence apart from being a concept?, i.e., does “phenomena” imply an exclusively physical existence?
The other possibility is that he is referring to a will that is independent of the mind. In either case, so far, I’m not buying into this idea.
How can the “undetermined” be deterministically anything? To be “undetermined” implies: causing nothing and having no cause. That doesn’t sound like any kind of will to me; it’s sounds more like “not existing”.
What proper way can one use “God” that doesn’t sound like speculative fiction about advanced forms of life seeding planets with less advanced forms of life; i.e., is a proper “God” just some superior person? a creator of humans? or the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe?
Are you saying that 8 is not a number, that a number is not a symbol representing magnitude or amount or are you saying both? So far, I’m not getting why any of this should make sense.
It’s not redundant. “The number 8 is a number.” is redundant.
How can proposing that 8 is a subset of “number” obscure the meaning of “number”?
“Number” is not a function, just as it’s not a variable; a function represents a subset of “number” just as a variable represents a subset of “number”.
When you say that “number” is an operation, then that’s exactly what you’re saying.
In that context I agree that reaction is a type of action.
I’m inclined to view “actions” from “faulty logic” as operations with signs. And actions as operations on symbols with respect to their truth-grounds. I say there’s a difference: signs don’t have truth-grounds except as symbols.
That’s my reference. But it’s not a part of the world of phenomena. It stands beyond objects and the immediate object, the body. It is what has agency. But nothing rules out that it’s a wholeness of phenomena.
I think that’s a fair implication. Phenomena starts from a whole; “physical existence” starts from parts. The latter is likely incoherent anyway.
That will is the subject of TWWR. But TWWR is an attempt to lock it away for good. To find a new ground.
I mean to say ‘to be free’ is to be on the field of disjunctive norms. One cannot be free in a system of injunctive norms. And yet, both the field and the system are — aside from all above and higher metaphors — right here. I say it’s determined that freedom is not to be found within a system of injunctive norms. It’s determined that freedom is only found on the field of disjunctive norms. From that field, the will is free from the vector system.
I go with ‘God’ as the truth-ground for the general form of a proposition. So, the manifestation of ‘God’ is rationality in our communication.
A number is the exponent of an operation (6.021). 8 is the sum of an exponent of an operation, a variable operated upon 8 different times. ‘8’ is a symbol that represents how many times a variable is operated upon.
Well, I think you’ll admit that what ‘8’ actually is is a bit more complex (and simple) than “a number.”
I haven’t claimed that.
‘Number’ is not an operation. Number — the verb — is an operation. ‘Number’ a symbol whose sense is number, the verb.
Instead of using terminology that hardly anyone will understand, why not just refer to rationally motivated actions and irrationally motivated actions, i.e., rational and irrational behavior?
Terminology like “truth-grounds” or “signs” can be subsumed by “logic” or “rational” for those who understand their meaning through the use of your preferred terms.
I don’t understand the use of “but”; in what way does your statement differ?
I don’t know what this means; are you saying that it may be a phenomena unto itself but not part of the world of phenomena? If so, then do you mean by this that, even if it’s a phenomena, it’s not a physical phenomena?
I don’t agree with this implication, there’s nothing about the word phenomena that restricts it to physical existence.
I offered these two possible implications of non-physical “will” as being mutually exclusive, yet you seem to be agreeing that both are to which he refers. I’m confused. BTW: Is there one with which you agree? or both? If so, I can’t imagine why, but would like to know.
How can the “undetermined” be deterministically anything?
I mean to say ‘to be free’ is to be on the field of disjunctive norms. One cannot be free in a system of injunctive norms. And yet, both the field and the system are — aside from all above and higher metaphors — right here. I say it’s determined that freedom is not to be found within a system of injunctive norms. It’s determined that freedom is only found on the field of disjunctive norms. From that field, the will is free from the vector system.
OK, but that doesn’t address my main concern:
And since “God” as a being or as a metaphor has typically been meant for “that which is beyond understanding”, “that which hasn’t the necessary meaning to be considered in terms of truth” or the object of incoherent faith, your “God” is really “anti-God”.
An exponent is a power.
Do you mean a multiplier? as in 8 chickens means the variable (a chicken) is multiplied by 8?
If “number” is a more general concept that includes “8” then it’s more complex than “8”.
Is “8” a subset of “number” or not?
When we say, “‘8’ is a number” the word “a” implies “number” is a noun.
No, I don’t think they can. Truth-grounds is to internal relationships as logic is to symbolic relationships. Signs is to chess pieces as rational is to chess moves. Tractarian vocabulary is no doubt difficult, like learning another language almost, but each level to it is necessary (except the last, according to the resolute reading). And attempts to mash up the levels for the sake of convenience is bound to create confusion. Besides, without specific appeal to truth-grounds, “logic” can be taken down by presentations (Heck, 2000).
I don’t think that a wholeness of phenomena counts as assuming the phenomenal form. The particular phenomenal forms are by-products of the wholeness.
It constitutes the parts of phenomena. “Every piece contains a map of it all” (Incubus, 2009). And from Wholeness and the Implicate Order, (Bohm, 2002)
Your next question,
I disagree with the one that is prior to mind. That one is manifest in the horrors of murders, etc. As the book progresses, another “will” suggests itself that is entirely free of the first kind of will. But the new “will” is subservient to the intellect and the intellects particular manifestations in art. The intellect is the by-product of the wholeness of phenomena. So this second “will” is what Kant called Good Will.
The Space of Reasons is deterministically outside cause and effect. If the complaint is that “deterministically” isn’t the most apt word here, then I concede that point.
I mean, no Rabbi ever told me that “God” is beyond understanding. Maybe beyond certain modes of understanding, but I don’t see the point in religion if “God” is just a place-holder for blind obedience to blind representatives. Blindness only applies to certain modes of understanding. And from those modes, it is useful to think of “God” as a variable for that which one doesn’t yet have the tools to grasp. I think that’s perfectly in line with the disjunctive field.
Yeah.
Once you put a proper concept in place of the variable, then the variable is no longer a formal concept. Number is the power of a formal concept.
I wouldn’t say it includes 8. 8 falls under it.
8 is to number as ‘and’ is to logical grammar. 8 is in the gravitational field of ‘number’. The formal concept ‘number’ gives 8 truth-grounds, but 8 is not a subset of ‘number’.
And I’m saying that language-game is the wrong one to play.
Instead of using terminology that hardly anyone will understand, why not just refer to rationally motivated actions and irrationally motivated actions, i.e., rational and irrational behavior?
Terminology like “truth-grounds” or “signs” can be subsumed by “logic” or “rational” for those who understand their meaning through the use of your preferred terms.
I don’t understand the use of “but”; in what way does your statement differ?
I don’t know what this means; are you saying that it may be a phenomena unto itself but not part of the world of phenomena? If so, then do you mean by this that, even if it’s a phenomena, it’s not a physical phenomena?
I don’t agree with this implication, there’s nothing about the word phenomena that restricts it to physical existence.
I offered these two possible implications of non-physical “will” as being mutually exclusive, yet you seem to be agreeing that both are to which he refers. I’m confused. BTW: Is there one with which you agree? or both? If so, I can’t imagine why, but would like to know.
How can the “undetermined” be deterministically anything?
I mean to say ‘to be free’ is to be on the field of disjunctive norms. One cannot be free in a system of injunctive norms. And yet, both the field and the system are — aside from all above and higher metaphors — right here. I say it’s determined that freedom is not to be found within a system of injunctive norms. It’s determined that freedom is only found on the field of disjunctive norms. From that field, the will is free from the vector system.
OK, but that doesn’t address my main concern:
And since “God” as a being or as a metaphor has typically been meant for “that which is beyond understanding”, “that which hasn’t the necessary meaning to be considered in terms of truth” or the object of incoherent faith, your “God” is really “anti-God”.
An exponent is a power.
Do you mean a multiplier? as in 8 chickens means the variable (a chicken) is multiplied by 8?
If “number” is a more general concept that includes “8” then it’s more complex than “8”.
Is “8” a subset of “number” or not?
When we say, “‘8’ is a number” the word “a” implies “number” is a noun.
Sorry about the problems in my last comment.
My computer was starting to freeze and I was lucky to even be able to click “submit”, let alone “preview”, before losing the whole thing.