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Tag Archives | Unethical Philosophy

Cloaking Device

By on October 10, 2011 7

We all know it’s depressing/frustrating to be a libertarian and watch tv. But the same applies to being a philosopher and watching tv.

spinning wheel illusion

Tonight I half-watched a series of National Geographic specials about vision, memory, illusions, and such. It was fascinating, and all the science in it was sound (AFAIK). But not all the purported science in it was science. What the series did (as is fairly typical for science programs) was to translate the scientific results into a conceptual framework that is actually philosophical (and philosophically controversial), not scientific. All the stuff about colour not existing in extramental reality, about our brains “filling in” background information, and so forth are part of a particular philosophical interpretation of the scientific data, not something one can simply read off the data.

I happen to think that the particular conceptual framework into which the National Geographic series was cramming its data is a deeply mistaken and oft-refuted philosophical confusion. But that’s not my point just now. My point is that the people who make shows like this don’t even realise that they are making any philosophical assumptions. And that in turn is because the entire field of philosophy is essentially invisible in our culture (meaning, in this context, American culture; things are a bit different in, say, France). People who are interested in what are actually philosophical questions generally turn to science or religion, because they are simply unaware that there are philosophical methods for addressing such questions.

Constitutionally Impaired?

By on August 24, 2011 20

I agree with most of what Walter Williams says here, so let me churlishly focus on the bit I disagree with:

You might say, “Williams, while there are gray areas in the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court would never brazenly rule against clear constitutional prohibitions!” That’s nonsense. The first clause of Article 1, Section 10 mandates that “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” During the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law that restricted the ability of banks to foreclose on overdue mortgages, thereby impairing contracts made between lender and borrower. To prevent this kind of contract impairment – routinely done under the Articles of Confederation – was precisely why the Framers added the clause.

Lysander Spooner

I agree, of course, that the Supreme Court has little compunction about overriding “clear constitutional prohibitions.” But I don’t think the example Williams has chosen proves his case. To uphold the obligation of a contract does not mean to uphold whatever the contract says; otherwise contracts to sell oneself into slavery, or contracts to assassinate another person, would be legitimately enforceable. Thus contracting to do X is not by itself sufficient to incur an enforceable obligation to do X.

And as Lysander Spooner argues:

“The obligation of contracts,” here spoken of, is, of necessity, the natural obligation; for that is the only real or true obligation that any contracts can have.

The court’s decision in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell thus counts as violating the constitutional prohibition on impairing the obligation of contracts only if those contracts were legitimately enforceable under natural law. Now maybe they were and maybe they weren’t; that moral question is not my current concern. My point is simply that one cannot determine whether the court violated the constitution in this case without addressing that moral question; it’s not something that one can simply read off the words.

Preserved in JARS

By on August 18, 2011 2

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies now has online archives. Here, selfishly (appropriately), is a list of links to my own JARS articles over the past decade:

The Benefits and Hazards of Dialectical Libertarianism (2.2, Spring 2001)

Keeping Context In Context: The Limits of Dialectics (3.2, Spring 2002)

Praxeology: Who Needs It (6.2, Spring 2005)

Reference and Necessity: A Rand-Kripke Synthesis? (7.1, Fall 2005)

A Beauty Contest For Dichotomies: Browne’s Terminological Revolutions (8.1, Fall 2006)

Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues: Aristotle versus Seddon (10.1, Fall 2008)

Most of those were my side of debates with other people, so you should probably go read their side too. Plus lots of other good stuff. Here.

Anarchy In Seattle: Call For Papers

By on August 4, 2011 1

The Molinari Society

MolinariSociety.org

Call for Papers

for the Society’s Symposium to be held in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting, April 4-8, 2012, Seattle.

Symposium Topic:
Explorations in Philosophical Anarchy (II)

Submission Deadline:
September 30, 2011

Seattle

The past two decades have seen a resurgence of interest, both in activist and academic circles, in Anarchist politics and theory, with new and challenging work from several different directions. Renewed academic interest in Anarchism has drawn attention to the importance, vitality and philosophical fruitfulness of key Anarchist arguments and concepts – such as the conflict between authority and autonomy; tensions between collectivism and individualism; critical challenges to hierarchy, centralized power, top-down control and authoritarian conceptions of representation; and the development of concepts of spontaneous social order, decentralized consensus, and the knowledge problems and ideological mythologzing inherent in relations or structures of domination.

Most of this discussion has, naturally enough, taken place within the field of political and moral philosophy. But Anarchist theory (like marxist or feminist theory) embodies more than a policy orientation or a system of moral or political theses. The Anarchist tradition offers a wide-ranging, diverse and vigorously argued literature, concerning the nature and foundations of human society, with implications for every aspect of philosophy, including not only political and moral theory but also aesthetics, social-science methodology, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, religion, history, language and logic. We are looking for papers that address possible connections, approaches, challenges or insights that anarchy and its conceptual environs may suggest for philosophy broadly – or that philosophy may suggest for anarchy – beyond the familiar territory of political and moral theory, especially in such areas as epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and metaphilosophy or philosophical method. Papers from all analytical and critical standpoints (both with regard to philosophy and with regard to Anarchism) are welcome.

Seattle anarchists stimulating the glazier industry

Please submit complete papers of 3,000-6,000 words for consideration for the 2012 Symposium by September 30, 2011. Papers should be of appropriate scope and length to be presented within 15-30 minutes. Submitting authors will be notified of the acceptance or rejection of their papers by October 10, 2011.

Submit papers as e-mail attachments, in Word .doc format or PDF, to longrob@auburn.edu or feedback@radgeek.com.

For any questions or information, contact us at the above email addresses.

* * *

Some possible topics include – but are by no means limited to:

  • Authority and Epistemology
  • Anarchy and Logic
  • Illusions of control in philosophy
  • Decentralism or spontaneous order in philosophy of language
  • Philosophical implications of the work of “canonical” Anarchist theorists (Godwin, Proudhon, Molinari, Tucker, Spooner, Kropotkin, Tolstoy, De Cleyre, Goodman, Bookchin, Rothbard, Wolff, Zerzan…)
  • Anarchy and Rationality
  • Hierarchy, legibility and knowledge problems
  • Philosophical Method and Anarchism
  • Claims of representation and claims of knowledge
  • Etc.

Please spread the word to anyone who you think would be interested in the symposium topic!

Addendum:

More info here.

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