[cross-posted at Liberty & Power]
I’ve argued that the decision as to whether to support Ron Paul’s candidacy involves a trade-off between long-term and short-term gains; that there is no one rationally compulsory way for libertarians to resolve this trade-off; that my own commitments give me reason not to support his candidacy, but that nevertheless I wish him success.
Keith Halderman evidently thinks I am lying. That is, he apparently believes not only that my position as described above is mistaken (which of course it may well be) but that it is not my real position. Or so I infer from a recent L&P thread in which he writes, addressing me:
let us be clear about this, your time preference is not to ignore Paul’s effort because you do not think he can succeed, your time preference is to actively work against his success
This is a surprising assertion. After all, here’s a sampling of my remarks about Ron Paul over the past year (from posts here, here, here, and here):
1. Most of my libertarian comrades seem to think that Ron Paul is either a) the Second Coming, or b) the Apocalypse. … I’m somewhere in between: I have a lot of serious problems with his candidacy, but I admit I’m also gratified every time I see his poll numbers rising.
2. I have plenty of problems with Ron Paul – most notably on immigration, abortion, and gay rights. But he is astronomically superior to any other Republican candidate out there; I wish him well, and hope he shakes up the GOP plenty.
3. I neither endorse nor oppose Paul (I disagree with him on too many issues to officially “endorse” him; but I vastly prefer him to all his rivals and thus wish his campaign well).
4. Paul, despite his deviations, would likely pursue policies whose direct results would be significantly more libertarian than otherwise. … I think that’s a reason to hope he does well, and I do hope he does well. In fact, I will go so far as to say that if there were a button such that pushing it would guarantee Paul’s election … then I would happily push it.
5. I don’t support Ron Paul’s candidacy, then, because my own talents, proclivities, and commitments lie with the Agorist and left-libertarian projects, and I value the promotion of those projects over the short-term benefits that Paul’s candidacy might gain at the expense of those projects. But I can’t see that this preference is compulsory for everybody. Even if every libertarian ought to be an Agorist and a cultural lefty … it seems to me that it does not follow that every libertarian ought to make the trade-off between those long-run projects and the possible short-run gains from Paul’s candidacy the same way I do.
I think it’s fairly clear, then, that my position is not fairly describable as “to actively work against his success.” Keith Halderman’s description of my position is baseless.
I’ve repeatedly asked him to offer evidence for his claim, but so far he has made no response. Well, perhaps he hasn’t looked in the comments section to his last post lately. So I’m moving my query to L&P’s main page.
Keith, please either back up your charge or retract it.
The Society of Tomorrow has been 
This reminded me of a passage from that other Russian radical, Ayn Rand:
Incidentally, many Gnostic sects had a very similar view of the matter. Noticing the contrast between the Bible’s first creation narrative (Genesis 1:1-2:2, in which a god named Elohim creates a perfect universe) and its second creation narrative (Genesis 2:3-3:24, in which a god named Yahweh creates, in somewhat difference chronological sequence, a rather more flawed universe), the Gnostics concluded that Elohim was the true God while Yahweh was the devil – in which case the serpent, bringing the knowledge of their true divine nature to Adam and Eve, was a Christlike emissary of the true God and a Prometheus-like benefactor of humankind. (See, for example, the Nag Hammadi texts 
But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God. (John 1:12)
But by contrast with both the Gnostic account (which identifies Elohim with God and Yahweh with Satan) and the mainstream account (which takes Elohim and Yahweh to be unproblematically identical), the Christian Science account treats Yahweh as a false or limited conception of Elohim, a “physical sense of God as finite and corporeal” – but still a conception of Elohim. Rather than simply representing a different point of view by a different author (which is what most Bible scholars infer), this second narrative, according to the C.S. interpretation, represents an “allegory … to depict the falsity of error and the effects of error.” So the serpent still represents evil rather than good – an erroneous belief that “God was not omnipotent and that there was another power, named evil, which was as real and eternal as God”; and hence the “knowledge of good and evil” offered by the serpent represents not genuine knowledge but a confused belief that within the divine creation truth and error are equal in reality and power. In short, Jehovah represents a false conception of the divine reality as flawed, while the serpent, together with the spurious knowledge it offers, represents the conception of the flaw itself.