Sheldon has a nice post on why proper individualism is not atomistic – wherein he cites Aristotle, Spencer, and … me!
In related news, I’ve argued elsewhere that it is the least atomistic forms of individualism that have the strongest claim to be called radical individualism.
Charles’ latest BHL post comments on the latest issue of the Freeman.
C4SS is starting a new feature, called Mutual Exchange, somewhat on the model of Cato’s “Cato Unbound.”
First up is a piece by Anthony Gregory taking issue with Kevin Carson’s recent article on corporations. Replies by Kevin and others will be posted later.
Other exchanges will follow, including a continuation of the Molinari Society symposium on spontaneous order.
The latest issue of the Freeman features articles by Charles Johnson on monopoly capitalism, Kevin Carson on managerial progressivism, Gary Chartier on class analysis, Carl Watner on Lysander Spooner, Sheldon Richman on Lawrence O’Donnell and the IMF, and lots of other good stuff – including a piece by Ludwig von Mises titled “Ludwig von Mises: Economist, Philosopher, Prophet” (though I gather that Mises didn’t choose the title).
I agree with most of what Walter Williams says here, so let me churlishly focus on the bit I disagree with:
You might say, “Williams, while there are gray areas in the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court would never brazenly rule against clear constitutional prohibitions!” That’s nonsense. The first clause of Article 1, Section 10 mandates that “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” During the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law that restricted the ability of banks to foreclose on overdue mortgages, thereby impairing contracts made between lender and borrower. To prevent this kind of contract impairment – routinely done under the Articles of Confederation – was precisely why the Framers added the clause.
I agree, of course, that the Supreme Court has little compunction about overriding “clear constitutional prohibitions.” But I don’t think the example Williams has chosen proves his case. To uphold the obligation of a contract does not mean to uphold whatever the contract says; otherwise contracts to sell oneself into slavery, or contracts to assassinate another person, would be legitimately enforceable. Thus contracting to do X is not by itself sufficient to incur an enforceable obligation to do X.
And as Lysander Spooner argues:
“The obligation of contracts,” here spoken of, is, of necessity, the natural obligation; for that is the only real or true obligation that any contracts can have.
The court’s decision in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell thus counts as violating the constitutional prohibition on impairing the obligation of contracts only if those contracts were legitimately enforceable under natural law. Now maybe they were and maybe they weren’t; that moral question is not my current concern. My point is simply that one cannot determine whether the court violated the constitution in this case without addressing that moral question; it’s not something that one can simply read off the words.
Peter Jackson (yes, that Peter Jackson) and Kevin Carson on the West Memphis Three.