But you consider wandering across someone’s land “force.”

Under some circumstances, sure. Not under all.

Why cannot someone who wants to justify enforceable positive rights consider failing to meet one’s obligations “force” as well?

Well, I’ve already explained why I think violating libertarian property rights counts as aggression and why I think failing to meet one’s basic positive obligations doesn’t. Now maybe my arguments are no good; that’s entirely possible. Maybe no other libertarians’ arguments for such conclusions are no good either; that’s possible too. But so far you I haven’t seen you spending much time criticising any of these actual arguments; instead you just keep repeating the point that the libertarian position depends on regarding some things as aggression and others as not — as if anyone had denied it.

And I’ve asked you a question that I don’t think you ever answered, so here goes again:

Do you think all conceptions of force, or of aggression, are equally defensible?

Because if not, then the fact that people might disagree about what constitutes force or aggression does not by itself constitute an objection to an argument that relies on some particular conception thereof. It just becomes like the freshman question “who’s to say …?” endlessly repeated in despite of all evidence or argument.

But you consider wandering across someone’s land “force.” Why cannot someone who wants to justify enforceable positive rights consider failing to meet one’s obligations “force” as well?

ii) Market interaction = the pattern of behavior between owners, manufacturers, suppliers, and buyers — specifically, the price of oil relative to the long-run costs vs. benefits of the means of production (safety concerns), distribution (cartelization concerns), and consumption (uncritical consent concerns).

b) Unclear meaning of “market interaction” in premises 2 and 3, leaving their truth-value unclear.

(1) Encroachment on the right to life can — morally — be met with proportionate force.

(2) Life is encroached by unsustainable yet persistent patterns of market interaction.

(3) The current intersection of market supply and market demand for energy manifests a relatively persistent pattern of market interaction.

(4) The market interaction for energy compels consumers into unsustainable forms of life [from (2) and (3)].

(5) The market interaction for energy can — morally — be met with proportionate force [from (1) and (4)].

(Given that that’s what’s required for them to be derivative, the scope of positive rights thus generated is, I suspect, going to be narrower than you’re hoping for.)

The proper word is not ‘utopia’ then, it is dystopia.