Comments on: Itchy and Scratchy

By: Roderick

Roderick — Tue, 25 May 2010 12:46:13 +0000

I guess the ideas of compositional plasticity and multiple realisability, which were hailed with such enthusiasm in the 70s, still haven’t really gotten their message through.

By: Matt Flipago

Matt Flipago — Tue, 25 May 2010 06:39:39 +0000

“Headaches may feel like pains, these experts aver, but they’re really not pains, because they involve neuronal thingummy B instead of neuronal thingummy A. Would you take this seriously? Surely not, because feeling like pain is simply what we mean by pain.”

The funniest thing is this idea is definitely believed by some. Many consider spiciness not to be a taste, only because it is not through the same neural transmitters.

By: Bruce

Bruce — Wed, 19 May 2010 09:48:57 +0000

Not to mention the obvious: self-controlling pain carries high potential for momentary euphoria. The generic example is the teenage girl who cuts herself. The depression is very painful — subjectively, but there’s also the deficiency of natural sources of arousal, pleasure, comfort, etc. — and so is the cutting. The cutting forces the pain that forces endorphins to trigger. Headaches, like the bug-like feeling under the skin, are normally related to physical deficiencies, right? (As opposed to an positive inducement of pain.)

By: Anna O. Morgenstern

Anna O. Morgenstern — Wed, 19 May 2010 01:13:06 +0000

Thank you for writing this Roderick. You elaborated something I’ve been trying to get some of my friends who are a bit too enthusiastic about pop science to understand.
“And that takes me to a broader grump about scientists, namely, that scientists tend to be unaware that there is such a thing as a philosophical objection to a thesis. They tend to assume that anything that sounds like a coherent hypothesis (such as the possibility of time travel, or the suggestion that the universe we live in is actually 2-dimensional – to pick a couple of actual examples) is thereby fit for empirical investigation, without considering that in such cases a) there is a prior question as to whether the thesis so much as makes sense (for if it does not, then those who take themselves to be performing an empirical investigation of it will actually not be investigating anything – or at least not that), and b) the training and tools to determine whether it does makes sense are the specialisation of a field other than their own. “

By: E5

E5 — Tue, 18 May 2010 14:24:54 +0000

So it seems like this whole issue could have been avoided if the original author presented his definition of “pain”, more likely than not it isn’t the same thing as headaches, emotional pain, etc.

Taking issue with such a trivial point provides incentive for authors to opt for more technical jargon as opposed to common terms that are *almost* the same thing as the technical jargon, if for no other reason it prevents armchair scientists from nitpicking word usage.

By: MBH

MBH — Tue, 18 May 2010 02:42:11 +0000

Very helpful.

By: Anon73

Anon73 — Tue, 18 May 2010 00:32:47 +0000

Recommended reading if at all possible? This is a provocative subject considering how science is regarded today (I hesitate to use words like “scientism”, but that’s probably more descriptive than any.)

By: Roderick

Roderick — Mon, 17 May 2010 23:33:01 +0000

Well, there’s certainly a long history of philosophers mistakenly trying to settle empirical questions conceptually. But there’s also a long history of scientists mistakenly trying to settle conceptual questions empirically. The problem is that scientists know about the first type of case but not the second.

By: Anon73

Anon73 — Mon, 17 May 2010 22:55:55 +0000

I’ve always been curious what you think the “philosophical presuppositions” of science are, and when scientists need to defer to philosophers. Most scientists I’ve met would be more likely to tell a self-described “philosopher” to finish bagging their groceries before taking their objections seriously. Ever since Aristotle came up with his theory of causes and elements and modern science disproved it I take it scientists are generally disdainful of philosophers in general.

By: Roderick

Roderick — Mon, 17 May 2010 21:36:19 +0000

Also:

colloquial use doesn’t confer identity

Well, use never confers identity, but it can specify it. And I think our use of the term “Pennsylvania Dutch” does specify the identity of what it’s referring to; it’s just that that use is different from our use of the term “Dutch” by itself. The Pennsylvania Dutch aren’t Dutch, just as a hot dog isn’t a dog; but it’s not as though something other than use specifies what “dog” and “hot dog” refer to.