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	<title>Comments on: The Land of We All</title>
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	<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/</link>
	<description>&#34;Austro&#34; as in Rothbard and Wittgenstein, &#34;Athenian&#34; as in Aristotle and smashing-the-plutocracy.</description>
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		<title>By: MBH</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354329</link>
		<dc:creator>MBH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Dec 2009 11:21:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354329</guid>
		<description>I understand how organic individualism is rooted in the we-subjectivity in regards to the political and economic realms.  But I don&#039;t think it&#039;s that clear in the motivational realm.  How can organic individualism maintain the we-subjectivity &lt;i&gt;and&lt;/i&gt; methodological subjectivism?  I understand how the atomistic individualist uses methodological subjectivism.  But for the organic individualist, beliefs, desires, and preferences are embedded in a culture.  They can be individuated through reflection.  But reflection is non-interactive and so up-rooted from the we-subjectivity.  Will you say how methodological subjectivism can stay embedded within the we-subjectivity?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I understand how organic individualism is rooted in the we-subjectivity in regards to the political and economic realms.  But I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s that clear in the motivational realm.  How can organic individualism maintain the we-subjectivity <i>and</i> methodological subjectivism?  I understand how the atomistic individualist uses methodological subjectivism.  But for the organic individualist, beliefs, desires, and preferences are embedded in a culture.  They can be individuated through reflection.  But reflection is non-interactive and so up-rooted from the we-subjectivity.  Will you say how methodological subjectivism can stay embedded within the we-subjectivity?</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354325</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Dec 2009 08:04:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354325</guid>
		<description>Well, I guess &lt;a href=&quot;http://praxeology.net/RadGreek.PDF&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; would be my longer statement as to why views that recognise social embeddedness can count as individualist, and indeed as radically individualist.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, I guess <a href="http://praxeology.net/RadGreek.PDF" rel="nofollow">this</a> would be my longer statement as to why views that recognise social embeddedness can count as individualist, and indeed as radically individualist.</p>
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		<title>By: MBH</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354323</link>
		<dc:creator>MBH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Dec 2009 04:46:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354323</guid>
		<description>I should say: if the &#039;I&#039; is always already embedded in the we-subjectivity then that would &lt;i&gt;not&lt;/i&gt; contradict individualism.  But how is that kind of individualism distinct from collectivism?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I should say: if the &#8216;I&#8217; is always already embedded in the we-subjectivity then that would <i>not</i> contradict individualism.  But how is that kind of individualism distinct from collectivism?</p>
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		<title>By: MBH</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354313</link>
		<dc:creator>MBH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Dec 2009 02:43:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354313</guid>
		<description>&lt;b&gt;...[I]nternalism and externalism are theories...&lt;/b&gt;

I don&#039;t understand what you mean by &quot;theories.&quot;  I would agree that depending-or-not-on-environmental-context is &lt;i&gt;part&lt;/i&gt; of what&#039;s in question.  But the word &#039;theory&#039; comes from the Greek word &#039;theoria&#039; meaning &quot;to view.&quot;  So, in that sense, I think that all &quot;theories&quot; are modes of perception.  

&lt;b&gt;And I still don’t understand what you mean by “conditioned” and “unconditioned.”&lt;/b&gt;

&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4B922LmoTYw&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Krishnamurti&lt;/a&gt; can do a much better job than I can.

&lt;b&gt;...[T]he ‘I’ is “always already” embedded in what you’re calling the we-subjectivity...&lt;/b&gt;

Will you say why that &lt;i&gt;doesn&#039;t&lt;/i&gt; contradict individualism?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><b>&#8230;[I]nternalism and externalism are theories&#8230;</b></p>
<p>I don&#8217;t understand what you mean by &#8220;theories.&#8221;  I would agree that depending-or-not-on-environmental-context is <i>part</i> of what&#8217;s in question.  But the word &#8216;theory&#8217; comes from the Greek word &#8216;theoria&#8217; meaning &#8220;to view.&#8221;  So, in that sense, I think that all &#8220;theories&#8221; are modes of perception.  </p>
<p><b>And I still don’t understand what you mean by “conditioned” and “unconditioned.”</b></p>
<p><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4B922LmoTYw" rel="nofollow">Krishnamurti</a> can do a much better job than I can.</p>
<p><b>&#8230;[T]he ‘I’ is “always already” embedded in what you’re calling the we-subjectivity&#8230;</b></p>
<p>Will you say why that <i>doesn&#8217;t</i> contradict individualism?</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354307</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 23:16:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354307</guid>
		<description>I don&#039;t understand what you mean in describing internalism and externalism as &quot;modes of perception.&quot;  As I understand them, internalism and externalism are theories about whether the existence and/or nature of a mental state depends on external/environmental context (with internalism saying no and externalism saying yes).  And I still don&#039;t understand what you mean by &quot;conditioned&quot; and &quot;unconditioned.&quot;

Further, I don&#039;t understand what you mean in saying that the &#039;I&#039; has to &quot;loosen its grip&quot; and &quot;resituate itself.&quot;  As I see it, the &#039;I&#039; is &quot;always already&quot; embedded in what you&#039;re calling the we-subjectivity; it doesn&#039;t have to &lt;em&gt;travel&lt;/em&gt; anywhere.  Maybe you think that contradicts individualism.  I don&#039;t see that it does; but maybe I don&#039;t understand what you mean by individualism.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t understand what you mean in describing internalism and externalism as &#8220;modes of perception.&#8221;  As I understand them, internalism and externalism are theories about whether the existence and/or nature of a mental state depends on external/environmental context (with internalism saying no and externalism saying yes).  And I still don&#8217;t understand what you mean by &#8220;conditioned&#8221; and &#8220;unconditioned.&#8221;</p>
<p>Further, I don&#8217;t understand what you mean in saying that the &#8216;I&#8217; has to &#8220;loosen its grip&#8221; and &#8220;resituate itself.&#8221;  As I see it, the &#8216;I&#8217; is &#8220;always already&#8221; embedded in what you&#8217;re calling the we-subjectivity; it doesn&#8217;t have to <em>travel</em> anywhere.  Maybe you think that contradicts individualism.  I don&#8217;t see that it does; but maybe I don&#8217;t understand what you mean by individualism.</p>
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		<title>By: MBH</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354299</link>
		<dc:creator>MBH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 19:11:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354299</guid>
		<description>Epistemically, I would say that the unconditioned is the point at which externalism and internalism are indistinguishable.  Internalism (as mode of perception) is always tainted by emotions which are conditioned by individual prior experiences and mental associations.  Externalism (as mode of perception) is always tainted by a lack of insight into how already-existing-conceptual-frameworks are shaping the information gathered.  

So I&#039;m speaking of a mode of perception in which the external view is aware of how conceptual frameworks shape information and the internal view is aware of how history (personal and collective) shapes information.  I think &lt;i&gt;those&lt;/i&gt; awarenesses would constitute an unconditioned experience.   

But for the internal view to be aware of how collective history shapes information, it would need to reference the &lt;i&gt;endoxa&lt;/i&gt;.  To do so would require the perspective from the we-subjectivity.  I don&#039;t see how individualism can access the we-subjectivity.  To access the we-subjectivity, the &#039;I&#039; has to loosen its grip from one perspective and understand itself as a collective perspective.  Where does individualism allow the &#039;I&#039; to resituate in that way?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Epistemically, I would say that the unconditioned is the point at which externalism and internalism are indistinguishable.  Internalism (as mode of perception) is always tainted by emotions which are conditioned by individual prior experiences and mental associations.  Externalism (as mode of perception) is always tainted by a lack of insight into how already-existing-conceptual-frameworks are shaping the information gathered.  </p>
<p>So I&#8217;m speaking of a mode of perception in which the external view is aware of how conceptual frameworks shape information and the internal view is aware of how history (personal and collective) shapes information.  I think <i>those</i> awarenesses would constitute an unconditioned experience.   </p>
<p>But for the internal view to be aware of how collective history shapes information, it would need to reference the <i>endoxa</i>.  To do so would require the perspective from the we-subjectivity.  I don&#8217;t see how individualism can access the we-subjectivity.  To access the we-subjectivity, the &#8216;I&#8217; has to loosen its grip from one perspective and understand itself as a collective perspective.  Where does individualism allow the &#8216;I&#8217; to resituate in that way?</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354291</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 17:03:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354291</guid>
		<description>At this moment the correct time is 11:22 central time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At this moment the correct time is 11:22 central time.</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354290</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 17:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354290</guid>
		<description>And that one says 12:00 too.  Looks like the time indicator is fritzin&#039;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And that one says 12:00 too.  Looks like the time indicator is fritzin&#8217;.</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354289</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 17:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354289</guid>
		<description>Now why does the timestamp on that last post say 12:00?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now why does the timestamp on that last post say 12:00?</p>
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		<title>By: Roderick</title>
		<link>http://aaeblog.com/2009/12/22/the-land-of-we-all/comment-page-1/#comment-354288</link>
		<dc:creator>Roderick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 17:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://aaeblog.com/?p=4110#comment-354288</guid>
		<description>Well, I&#039;m still not sure how to answer, because I&#039;m still not sure I grasp how you&#039;re thinking of conditioned and unconditioned.  

I&#039;m also not sure how you&#039;re thinking of functionalism.  It sounds like it&#039;s the externalist aspect of functionalism that you&#039;re appealing to.  Well, I have no objection to externalism per se; quite the contrary.  But I see functionalism as a &lt;em&gt;reductionist&lt;/em&gt; form of externalism; it defines mental states in terms of causal interactions among events, where those events themselves are &lt;i&gt;definable in non-mental terms&lt;/i&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, I&#8217;m still not sure how to answer, because I&#8217;m still not sure I grasp how you&#8217;re thinking of conditioned and unconditioned.  </p>
<p>I&#8217;m also not sure how you&#8217;re thinking of functionalism.  It sounds like it&#8217;s the externalist aspect of functionalism that you&#8217;re appealing to.  Well, I have no objection to externalism per se; quite the contrary.  But I see functionalism as a <em>reductionist</em> form of externalism; it defines mental states in terms of causal interactions among events, where those events themselves are <i>definable in non-mental terms</i>.</p>
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