To praxeology: action is basic. No-thing is more basic. So praxeology’s foundation is prior to the split between subject and object. We may describe action in terms of subjects and/or objects exchanging, but that description is not fundamental.

So, you’re right that it doesn’t dissolve the object/subject dichotomy in the sense that it doesn’t have to. From a praxeological perspective, that distinction doesn’t arise.

But then the praxeological perspective is limited. Some “interactions” (in everyday experience) are fundamentally and thoroughly framed through a subject/object distinction. That is, the “actor’s” means or ends do not make sense without reference to another “actor” as the means or as the end. Praxeology, as it were, cannot see or make sense of these things because — in them — action is not basic. In these situations, I’m not describing what happens as a subset of action, but something qualitatively different.

In other words, I think we impress the object/subject dichotomy on the world of action. At first, that just causes mis-perception. Eventually though — when enough people believe that to be basic — we move in such a way that takes object/subject to be basic. That movement is not action. Call it what you like, but don’t call it action.

I’m not saying it’s good or bad. I’m just saying that not everything we want to call action is actually action. Just as not everything we want to call thinking is actually thinking.

Humans are, among other things, animals and machines. One human using another’s mechanical and animal capabilities for his own gain is engaged in action, the same as if he were using any other machine or animal. He’s being an asshole, sure, but he’s engaged in action. Likewise, the person being so used is engaged in action, so far as he chooses to acquiesce in this use.

How does the indistinguishability between subject and object have anything to do with ethics?

…it entails that slaves are incapable of action…

Not true. I say that the recognition of and raising-awareness-to something beyond the subject/object dichotomy most certainly counts as action. So, for instance, teachers, writers, and musicians are all in better places of action than oligarchs.

But, okay. Let’s grant your point for the sake of argument. Since it entails that slaves are incapable of action, just as such, that means they are no longer humans, and so, the slaver counts as acting just as much as he would if he were keeping and using any other non-human capital.

I should add: when I say that “raising awareness to the subject/object dichotomy [counts as action even in slavery situations,]” that may be misleading. By that, I simply mean, causing recognition of the dichotomy and raising awareness to something beyond it.

To me, the god’s eye view (which I think praxeology embodies) dissolves the distinction between subject and object. But, in all of the cases you list, choice is framed by a subject/object dichotomy. Even attempting escape means a person-turned-object trying to free itself from a subject. My contention is simply that these situations — in which a person is turned object — disallow for any action* by anyone.

*With the exception of raising awareness to the subject/object dichotomy.

Choice follows from scarcity.

I want to take praxeology as seriously as possible — experimentally to adopt what you call a meta-praxeological view. I think you’d agree that action entails choice while re-action entails the absence of choice. But, when Larry enslaves a bunch of people, where is their choice? When Jimmy steals a T.V. set, where is the owner’s choice? Who says that praxeology is limited to one person’s point of view? Isn’t praxeology stronger if we understand it as a god’s eye view?