Reich doesn’t say interest rates were artificially low, or that credit was unjustifiably extended. But he doesn’t rule it out either.

My raw intuition on the subject obviously comes in rights-ist packaging (although obviously said intuition is not my ACTUAL approach which is pure consequentialism: tool component increases material freedom; can’t outlaw WMD component in the long run without completely eradicating freedom) and I’m interested in how it might be structured as an argument taking into account the standing threat concern and the like. Threats are obviously murky waters because you’re introducing intentionality as a critical component to an otherwise relatively simplistic system defined by distinction of positive and negative action. But rights-centered ethical systems seem to fall rather flat without some recognition of threat. And it’s really hard to see building a nuclear warhead in the light of anything else besides a threat.

>” If we’re imagining near-future-plausible but not-yet-actual situations where there would be some non-aggressive use… then that would tend to undermine the rights-based case for forcible disarmament in those cases. But it’d also tend to undermine the demand for such a case, since those are just cases where it looks like the intuitive demand for forcible disarmament is as weak as the theoretical case for its legitimacy.”

I don’t see this. Just because Genocide is not the ONLY use for my Genocide Device, doesn’t diminish the existential threat possessing it poses. My point in bringing up the Viral or Nanogoo hypotheticals was to reduce our capacity to recognize intent. Pointing a gun is rather clear, but if everyone has access to DIY designer genetics kits and the vast majority of their uses (and statistically desired uses) are positive or at least non-Genocidal, doesn’t diminish the very real threat they pose. Tweaking the e coli genes one way as opposed to the other (or just suddenly and unexpectedly pressing the button on your otherwise asteroid-mining nuke) is an obscured action with effectively immediate results. The rights-ist case for retaining one’s capacity to bioengineer your own supper can remain strong while conflicting with a very strong standing threat case.

I’m interested in the rights-ist take on all this. … I’m a long time intuitive supporter of nuclear proliferation into the hands of individuals (albeit hopefully at some as yet undetermined time in the future after everyone has evolved into enlightened anarchs)

Well, either people have an unconditional right to possession of atomic weapons or they don’t. If they lean towards the position that you say you intuitively support, then the rights-based case is pretty easy to make out. (Right to nonviolently possess powerful tools as long as you don’t threaten to use them aggressively against any identifiable victims, etc.)

If you lean more towards a position that would allow forcible disarmament, then the challenge is to come up with a non-strictly-consequentialist argument to the effect that it doesn’t violate the rights of the person being disarmed. That’s a lot harder but I don’t think it’s impossible. (Presumably it would have something to do with the lack of possible non-aggressive uses for currently-feasible sorts of atomic weapons and some conception of a standing threat. And presumably you could make out much the same case against, say, private possession of some killer nanoplague. If we’re imagining near-future-plausible but not-yet-actual situations where there would be some non-aggressive use — e.g. asteroid demolition, low-yield weapons, whatever — then that would tend to undermine the rights-based case for forcible disarmament in those cases. But it’d also tend to undermine the demand for such a case, since those are just cases where it looks like the intuitive demand for forcible disarmament is as weak as the theoretical case for its legitimacy.)

For someone like Roderick, who holds that considerations about what has good or bad results can actually play a role in deliberation about what rights people have (and vice versa, in deliberation about what would count as a good or bad result), there are a lot of further nuances that I haven’t mentioned.

Either way, it seems to me like this issue is probably orthogonal to the consequentialist-natural rights debate. Or if it’s angled a bit, the angle actually would tend to tilt rightsers more towards your own expressed position than it would consequentialists.

I worry about that issue, which is why I said I “lean” toward his position rather than embracing it. I haven’t fully worked out where I stand on this. Also related is the question of how great a risk one can impose on one’s neighbours before it becomes a rights-violation, and whether that level varies with other considerations.