Couldn’t a woud-be thick libertarian argue that we ought to adopt a particular philosophical view about libertarianism (viz. the thick conception of it) for other reasons distinct from and alongside our libertarian commitments? For example, that it should be adopted for reasons of intellectual clarity, considered as desirable in itself rather than as a means to libertarian triumph or whatever else?

I never thought the sole justification for adopting a thick conception of libertarianism need be only on libertarian grounds.

Or does thick libertarianism only describe those extra-libertarian views adopted solely for the sake of promoting libertarianism?

Reminds me of the Rothbard vs. Cato flap vis-à-vis nuclear energy.

I’ve always wondered why the Rockwell crowd thought support for GMO and industrial agriculture was needed for true “libertarian” credentials.

So one can nonthickly argue that it’s not that case that we must be thicklib. But one can’t non-thickly argue that it is the case that we shouldn’t be thicklib.

Well, thick libertarianism is the claim that libertarianism as such provides good reasons for libertarians to care about other commitments besides a rigorous commitment to non-aggression. So it’s true that if, for example, a would-be thin libertarian is arguing that we should abandon a particular nonviolently held philosophical view about libertarianism (viz. the thick conception of it) for, e.g., reasons of libertarian strategy, then she is really advancing a form of thick, not thin, libertarianism.

But couldn’t a woud-be thin libertarian instead argue that we ought to abandon a particular nonviolently held philosophical view about libertarianism (viz. the thick conception of it) for other reasons distinct from and alongside our libertarian commitments? For example, that it should be abandoned for reasons of intellectual clarity, considered as desirable in itself rather than as a means to libertarian triumph or whatever else?

If so, then, while I would certainly disagree with the argument for abandoning a thick conception of libertarianism, I wouldn’t think that the argument is internally contradictory. The appeal only becomes an appeal to thickness if the reasons being given are reasons that the libertarian is supposed to have qua libertarian, rather than (for example) qua philosopher or qua clear thinker.

Well, here’s a fairly precise statement — see the numbered list halfway through:
http://charleswjohnson.name/remarks/2005/12/28/narveson.

“Stephan, I never said libertarianism includes X or that libertarianism means Liberty-plus-X. That’s not what thick libertarianism says.”

I can never be sure what it says, since it seems vague, imprecise, non-rigorous, and ever-shifting to me. Sometimes its proponents do imply this.

“As for being a weak defense of thick libertarianism, I take the case for thick libertarianism as having already been made; this is just a supplement.”

fair enough. I haven’t been convinced by these either, FWIW.

“Anyway, a “straw man” is an argument nobody gives; lots of people do give this argument, so it’s not a straw man.”

Also a good point. What I mean is I agree this is a bad argument, but defeating it does not mean there are no good criticisms of thickism.

I’d say any argument for the claim that the added values are unneeded (as opposed to their actually being undesirable) would be a non-thick objection to thickness. So one can nonthickly argue that it’s not that case that we must be thicklib. But one can’t non-thickly argue that it is the case that we shouldn’t be thicklib.